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Effective Incentives and Chickpea Competitiveness in India 
Abstract 
This paper attempts to measure the impact of government intervention in 
product and factor markets on chickpea competitiveness in India. This is done by 
estimating the nominal (NPC), effective (EPC) and effective subsidy (ESC) protection 
coefficients for chickpea and its main competing crops - wheat and mustard. 
Further, the Net Economic Benefit (NEB) in the production of these three crops is 
estimated to indicate where comparative advantage and production efficiency in 
production lie. In addition, this paper also analyses the production constraints 
affecting chickpea competitiveness. The analysis is confined to the states of Haryana, 
Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. 
The protection coefficients indicate that the government's output price, 
subsidy and trade policies have discriminated against chickpea producers. These 
policies provided the greatest effective protection to mustard producers in all the 
four states studied. In Haryana wheat received greater protection than chickpea, 
though in both Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan chickpea had greater protection than 
wheat. This result indicates a general policy bias against chickpea producers in the 
northern wheat growing belt of India. The Net Economic Benefit coefficients show 
that all states have a comparative advantage in wheat and chickpea production, 
while only Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan have comparative 
advantage in mustard production also. However, across all states, wheat is the most 
efficient crop to produce. From a standpoint of economic efficiency, this result 
implies that India is better off allowing resources to flow into wheat production and 
importing its chickpea and mustard requirements. 
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Effective Incentives and Chickpea Competitiveness in India 
1. Introduction 
Pulses playa crucial part in India's food economy by providing cheap protein 
to a largely poor and vegetarian population. Their ability to rejuvenate the soil by 
fixing atmospheric nitrogen has made pulses figure prominently in crop rotations, 
while their hardiness has made them an ideal insurance crop for farmers against the 
vagaries of nature. Important as pulses are in the food economy, their cultivation 
has suffered in India. While other foodgrains like wheat and rice have made 
remarkable production increases, pulse production in India has remained stagnant 
between 10 to 13 million tons over the last forty years. One of the major reasons 
behind this stagnation is the negative growth in chickpea area and production in the 
post-Green Revolution period (Table 1). 
This declining chickpea acreage and production has given rise to many areas 
of concern. First, there has been a consistent decline in the per capita pulse 
availability from 70 grams per day in 1960/61 to 45 grams per day in 1990/91. This is 
much below the 70 grams per day quantity of pulse intake recommended by the 
Indian Council of Medical Research (Kelly and Rao, A-89). The negative growth in 
chickpea area and production is a major contributor to this. Second, the adoption of 
the rice-wheat sequence in the northern wheat growing zones during the post­
Green Revolution period directly resulted in the decline of the traditional 
intercropping or rotation of chickpea with wheat. The sustainability of the rice­
wheat sequence has been seriously questioned and one solution suggested has been 
to introduce a pulse crop into this rotation. Third, falling chickpea production has 
resulted in India going from a net exporter of chickpea in 1970 to a net importer in 
1995. By 1995, India's net imports of chickpea were 46,000 tons, valued at US$ 25.8 
million. Clearly, these levels of imports are costing the government dearly in terms 
of foreign exchange, besides sacrificing self-sufficiency and food security. 
This paper attempts to investigate chickpea's decline by examining its 
competitiveness relative to its main competing crops - wheat and mustard. First, 
factors such as technological constraints, profitability and risk are considered. 
Secondly, the role of India's agricultural price and trade policy and the pattern of 
incentives generated by government policy towards chickpea, mustard and wheat 
will be examined by estimating the following Coefficients of Protection; the 
Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC), the Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) and 
the Effective Subsidy Coefficient (ESC) for the three crops. This analysis will also 
attempt to identify which among chickpea, wheat and mustard is the most efficient 
•to produce. This would require the estimation of Net Economic Benefit (NEB) of 
chickpea, wheat and mustard production. Geographically, the study focuses on the 
states of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. In the first three 
chickpea area declined in the post-Green Revolution period while in Madhya 
Pradesh it has been increasing. 
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Table 1 All-India Compound Growth Rates of Area, Production and Yield of Selected Crops 
tv 
CROP
 
All Cereals 
Wheat 
Rice 
Coarse Cereals 
All Pulses 
Chickpea 
Red gram 
Other Pulses 
Mustard/Rapeseed 
Total Foodgrains 
Total Non-Foodgrains 
Total Crops 
1949/50 1949/50 1967/68 
to to to 
1992/93 1964/65 1980/81 
(Percent Per Annum) 
1980/81 
to 
1992/93 
Area Production 
0.60 
2.38 
0.81 
-0.32 
0.26 
-0.73 
0.97 
0.69 
2.00 
0.53 
0.97 
0.62 
3.00 
5.69 
2.63 
1.19 
0.50 
-0.15 
0.81 
0.99 
4.02 
2.70 
2.74 
2.71 
Yield 
2.04 
3.23 
1.81 
1.38 
0.38 
0.59 
-0.16 
0.30 
1.98 
2.03 
1.35 
1.87 
Area 
1.30 
2.68 
1.33 
0.90 
1.90 
1.64 
0.57 
2.07 
2.97 
1.41 
2.52 
1.61 
Production 
3.24 
3.99 
3.49 
2.23 
1.39 
2.66 
-1.34 
1.28 
3.36 
2.93 
3.54 
3.13 
Yield 
1.68 
1.27 
2.13 
1.29 
-0.22 
1.00 
-1.90 
-0.77 
0.37 
1.43 
0.93 
1.30 
Area Production Yield 
0.39 
2.94 
0.76 
-1.03 
0.45 
-0.55 
0.38 
1.06 
1.26 
0.38 
0.98 
0.54 
2.70 
5.64 
2.22 
0.62 
-0.39 
-1.03 
0.56 
-0.14 
1.50 
2.39 
2.36 
2.38 
1.78 
2.61 
1.46 
1.57 
-0.66 
-0.52 
0.16 
-1.18 
0.22 
1.54 
1.20 
1.43 
Area Production Yield 
-0.33 
0.44 
0.51 
-1.70 
0.13 
-1.31 
2.11 
0.39 
4.20 
-0.23 
0.79 
0.06 
3.07 2.97 
3.55 3.09 
3.46 2.94 
0.79 2.33 
1.50 1.41 
-0.61 0.70 
1.11 0.98 
3.34 2.93 
8.46 4.08 
2.94 3.75 
3.82 2.66 
3.22 3.58 
Source: Government of India, Area and Production of Principal Crops in India: 1990-93, (New Delhi: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Department of 
Agriculture and Co-operation, Ministry of Agriculture, 1993), 274-5. 
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2. Acreage Trends 
This negative growth in chickpea in the post-Green Revolution period (Table 
1) is largely due to its acreage declines in the Indo-Gangetic region, especially in the 
wheat growing states of Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh (Figures 1 and 2). During 
the same period there have been increases in chickpea acreage in central regions of 
India, especially in the states of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra (Figures 3 and 4). 
However, the comparatively small acreage increases in these states coupled with 
their low productivity has resulted in the overall decline of chickpea production in 
India. South India is not a major chickpea producing region. In addition, at the all­
India level, there has been a decline in the share of chickpea acreage (especially 
irrigated shares) of large operational holdings (Table 2). The bulk of chickpea acreage 
has shifted to marginal, small and medium sized holdings, indicating a 
disinclination among commercial producers to cultivate chickpea. For a detailed 
description of these trends see Kelly and Rao (1994), Sharma (1986) and Rao (1998). 
Turning to the geographical focus of this study, Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 describe 
the acreage trends among chickpea, wheat and mustard in the states of Haryana, 
Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh l • In Haryana (Figure 5), wheat acreage 
increased almost as rapidly as chickpea area declined, with mustard acreage rapidly 
increasing after 1980/81. With negligible increases in net cultivated area, most of the 
area gains by wheat and mustard were at the expense of chickpea. Indeed, between 
1970/71 and 1992/92, chickpea area in Haryana declined by 65 per cent, while wheat 
and mustard acreage increased by 73 and 33 per cent respectfully. In Uttar Pradesh, 
chickpea acreage has fallen off in a less drastic fashion (Figure 6), losing 50 per cent 
of its area between 1970/71 and 1993/93. However, the area lost in absolute terms has 
been greater than in Haryana. Here, chickpea seems to have lost acreage only to 
wheat, which increased acreage by 53 per cent in the same period. Mustard also 
declined, losing 43 per cent of its area. 
In the two main chickpea producing states of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh 
(Figures 7 and 8), the relative acreage trends are different from those of Haryana and 
Uttar Pradesh. These states did not experience any rapid increase in wheat area, and 
there was no corresponding rapid decline in chickpea area. In Rajasthan, wheat and 
chickpea seem to have had the same level of acreage till the early 1980's, after which 
chickpea acreage declined. Corresponding with chickpea's decline, mustard 
experienced a dramatic surge in acreage. Between 1970/71 and 1992/93, chickpea lost 
19 per cent of its area, while wheat and mustard increased their acreage by 42 and 78 
per cent respectfully. In Madhya Pradesh, chickpea, wheat and mustard all increased 
in area, with mustard joining in after 1980/81. This is the only state in which 
chickpea has gained acreage. Between 1970/71 and 1992/93, chickpea acreage 
increased by 46 per cent, while wheat and mustard increased by 1.5 and 19.5 per cent • 
respectively. 
I The area trends represent three year moving average values. 
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Figure 1 Major Rabi Pulses - Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar 
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Figure 2 Major Kharif Pulses - Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar 
and Bengal 
Source: Government of India, Area and Production of Principal Crops in India,
 
Various Issues, (New Delhi: Ministry of Agriculture)
 
Note: Area figures are three year averages.
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Figure 3 Major Rabi Pulses - Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra and Orissa. 
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Figure 4 Major Kharif Pulses - Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra and Orissa. 
Source: Government of India, Area and Production of Principal Crops, Various 
Issues, (New Delhi: Ministry of Agriculture). . 
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Table 2 All India - Cultivation of Chickpea by Size-Groups of 
Holdings 
Semi - AllYear Marginal Small Medium LargeMedium Classes
 
Total Chickpea Area
 
1970/71 7.7 10.5 18.3 31.5 32.0 100
 
1976/77 7.8 10.6 19.1 34.6 28.0 100
 
1980/81 9.0 10.9 19.6 33.5 27.1 100
 
1985/86 9.5 12.0 21.0 33.2 24.2 100
 
Irrigated Chickpea Area
 
1970/71 7.7 10.3 18.3 33.0 30.9 100
 
1976/77 8.8 11.4 19.9 36.4 23.4 100
 
1980/81 7.6 10.4 19.9 36.6 25.5 100
 
1985/86 8.4 15.2 23.4 34.0 19.0 100
 
Unirrigated Chickpea Area
 
1970/71 7.7 10.6 18.4 31.2 32.2 100
 
1976/77 7.6 10.5 18.9 34.3 28.7 100
 
1980/81 9.3 11.1 19.5 32.6 27.5 100
 
1985/86 9.8 11.3 20.5 33.1 25.4 100
 
Source: Government of India, All India Report on Agricultural Census. Various 
Issues, (New Delhi: Ministry of Agriculture). 
•
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3. Factors Affecting Chickpea Competitiveness 
The Green Revolution and Modern Wheat Varieties 
In the previous section it was seen that post-Green Revolution declines in 
chickpea acreage occurred more extensively in Haryana and Uttar Pradesh (to a 
lesser extent) than in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Much of this had to do with 
the technology involving the cultivation of modern wheat varieties, which were 
introduced as part of the Green Revolution in the former two states. Table 3 brings 
out the connection between the level of infrastructure available, the adoption of the 
new seed varieties and the resulting changes in the cropping pattern. The 
interconnectedness between the various elements of the Green Revolution and 
their impact on chickpea cultivation is clearly visible in this Punjab village example. 
As this village moved from traditional to modern farming methods, indicated by 
increased irrigation, fertilizer and mechanization, the cropping patterns also 
changed with rice and wheat becoming dominant crops at the expense of chickpea 
and non-foodgrain crops. 
It is striking that in just over a decade after the new seed varieties were 
introduced, wheat-chickpea inter-cropping fell from 24 percent of the cropped area 
to zero. This indicates that the HYV technology was such that it required HYV 
wheat to be planted as a monoculture. This affected the traditional mixed cropping 
of chickpea with wheat in the northern wheat growing zones (e.g., Haryana, 
Western Uttar Pradesh), leading to a further decline in chickpea acreage. In addition, 
the shift to modern agricultural methods (like the use of tube-well irrigation, 
chemical fertilizer and mechanization), increased the cropping intensity and 
changed the crop calendar. The short duration HYV varieties made this possible and 
as they replaced the longer duration traditional varieties, pulses like chickpea and 
redgram, which no longer fit the rotation, fell out. As HYV wheat began to displace 
chickpea from the from irrigated areas, chickpea began to be cultivated on marginal 
lands. 
Irrigation 
The spread of irrigation affected chickpea cultivation in a variety of ways. In 
the states of Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh, the availability of proper irrigation 
facilities (e.g. tube-wells, canals), led to the rapid adoption of modern wheat varieties 
and the consequent decline of chickpea. Further, the irrigation levels required by 
HYV wheat are detrimental to chickpea cultivation as it encourages excessive 
vegetative growth and disease spread (Kelly and Rao 1994, A-93). Indeed, some of 
the Haryana farmers reported that high levels of irrigation and fertilizer caused the 
chickpea plants to grow rapidly and then lodge. In this sense, the mixed cropping of 
chickpea and wheat is not suitable. In addition to this, the returns from irrigated 
wheat were much higher than that of chickpea (discussed later), which further 
encouraged the elimination of chickpea from irrigated regions. 
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Table 3 : Cropping Pattern Change In The Punjab, 1965 - 78 
A : Punjab State
 
1965 1978 % increase
 
Wheat yield 1.24 t/ha 2.73 t/ha 120%
 
Rice yield 1.00 t/ha 2.55 t/ha 155%
 
B : Punjab Village Study 
1. Irrigation 
Percentage of cropped land irrigated
 
1955 1965 1978
 
60% 80% 100%
 
Power sources
 
1955: 23 animal powered wells
 
1965: 24 animal powered wells + 2 motor drived tube wells
 
1978: 28 tubewells; mechanical pumps added to 22 of 24 older wells
 
2. Fertilizer
 
Fertilizer use increased by 300 %
 
Area used for composting increased four fold
 
3.	 Mechanization (tractors)
 
1965: None
 
1978: 3 large (50 hp) and 1 small
 
1986 : 9 tractors in village and no remaining bullocks
 
4. Cropping Pattern Changes (as % of cropped area) 
Kharif crops Rabi crops
 
1965 1978 1965 1978
 
Maize 21 40 Wheat 21 69
 
Sugarcane 31 27 Wheat + Chickpeas 24 0
 
Fodder 12 14 Sugarcane 31 26
 
Rice 0 10 Fodder 10 1
 
Cotton 17 1 Chickpeas 6 1
 
• 
Adapted from: Goldman, Abe and Joyotee Smith, "Agricultural Transformations in India and Northern 
Nigeria: Exploring the Nature of the Green Revolutions," World Development, 1993, Vol. 23, No.2: 245. 
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The effect of irrigation on the cultivation of chickpea acreage can be seen from 
Table 4. States like Haryana and Uttar Pradesh which witnessed the greatest increase 
in irrigation experienced the biggest declines in chickpea acreage. The increase in 
gross cropped area under irrigation has led to a decline in irrigated chickpea 
cultivation across all the northern states. Clearly, as irrigation spread the proportion 
of irrigated wheat increased, resulting in the elimination of competing crops like 
chickpea. In the central states irrigated chickpea actually increased acreage in 
Madhya Pradesh but slightly declined in Rajasthan, one of the major chickpea 
producing states. 
Surprisingly, there has also been a general decline in unirrigated chickpea 
acreage, indicating that chickpea has lost ground even in dryland agriculture. The 
crop that seems to be replacing unirrigated chickpea is mustard (except in Uttar 
Pradesh). 
Relative Profitability 
One of the main reasons for the decline in chickpea production was its lower 
profitability in relation to its competing crops. Surveying the profitability values in 
Table 5, one can see that in Haryana prior to 1985/86 wheat was the most profitable 
of the three while after this period mustard became more profitable. Indeed, 
chickpea was the least profitable of the three. In Uttar Pradesh, the data indicates that 
chickpea cultivation is more profitable than wheat. However, this conclusion may 
be misleading due to the data being aggregated over the vastly different eastern and 
western regions of the state2• If area trends are any indication (Figure 7), then wheat 
should certainly be more profitable than chickpea and mustard, both of which seem 
to be decreasing in area. In the two main chickpea producing states the profitability 
trends are different from those in the northern states. In Rajasthan mustard has 
been consistently more profitable than wheat and chickpea at least since the 
beginning of 1980/81, and chickpea more profitable than wheat. However, after 
1985/86, wheat has increased profitability over chickpea, making chickpea the least 
profitable of the three. In Madhya Pradesh, chickpea has been consistently more 
profitable than wheat cultivation (data for mustard are not available). However, 
given the profitability levels of mustard in the other states (especially Rajasthan), it 
would be reasonable to assume that in Madhya Pradesh too, mustard is more 
profitable than chickpea. A comparison of these profitability trends with their 
respective acreage trends (Figures 5 to 8) indicate that farmer's planting decisions are 
responsive and consistent to relative profits (except Uttar Pradesh). 
One of the major drawbacks in inferring acreage behavior and profitability 
from the above estimates is that the lack of data does not allow differentiation • 
2 Western Uttar Pradesh, which is well endowed with good infrastructure, is closer to Haryana and 
Punjab in its agriculture. Eastern Uttar Pradesh, which is not so well endowed is similar to the rest of 
the eastern Indo-Gangetic region. 
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Table 4 Changes in Irrigated and Non-irrigated Cropped Area 
Percent Irrigated Percent Unirrigated 
1970/71 1991/92 1970/71 1991/92 
Gross Cropped Area 45.0 77.9 55.0 22.1 
Chickpea 4.8 1.6 16.3 3.9 
Haryana Wheat 18.4 31.8 4.3 0.6 
Mustard 0.9 7.7 1.7 3.8 
Other 20.9 36.8 32.7 13.8 
Gross Cropped Area 36.0 57.2 64.0 42.8 
Chickpea 1.9 0.9 7.1 3.4 
Uttar Wheat 17.2 29.7 8.2 3.7 
Pradesh Mustard 0.3 1.8 9.0 3.2 
Other 16.6 24.8 39.7 32.5 
Gross Cropped Area 7.4 20.6 92.6 79.4 
Chickpea 0.5 2.6 7.4 6.6 
Madhya Wheat 2.5 8.8 14.0 6.6 
Pradesh Mustard 0.1 1.2 0.9 6.5 
Other 4.3 7.9 70.3 59.6 
Gross Cropped Area 14.7 29.1 85.3 70.9 
Chickpea 1.7 1.3 8.0 4.4 
Rajasthan Wheat 6.0 9.3 2.8 0.6 
Mustard 0.4 8.7 1.1 4.5 
Other 6.6 9.8 73.4 61.4 
Note: All crops are percentage of gross cropped area. 
Source: Fertilizer Association of India, Fertilizer Statistics, Various Issues, (New Delhi: 
Fertilizer Association of India.) 
• 
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Table 5 Relative Profit of Chickpea, Wheat and Mustard (Rs/Ha) 
State Crop 1975/76 1980/81 1985/86 1990/91 
Chickpea 603 994 1902 3716
 
Haryana Wheat 955 1683 2180 5199
 
Mustard 1827 3407 8115
 
Chickpea 1117 1856 2435
 
Uttar Pradesh Wheat 26 677 693 1938
 
Mustard 982 2013
 
Chickpea 352 848 1465 2189
 
Madhya Pradesh Wheat 361 760 1033 1682
 
Chickpea 644 1330 1863 2761
 
Rajasthan Wheat 381 902 1733 5085
 
Mustard 2310 3147 5972
 
Source: Government of India, Cost of Cultivation of Principal Crops in India, 
Various Issues, (New Delhi: Ministry of Agricultutre). 
Government of India, Area and Production of Principal Crops in India, 
Various Issues, (New Delhi: Ministry of Agriculture). 
• 
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between irrigated and unirrigated agriculture. An attempt to capture this has been 
made by taking the irrigated and unirrigated gross revenues of these crops as 
indicative of their relative profitability. 
Figures 9 to 16 describe the trends in gross revenue per hectare for irrigated 
and unirrigated varieties of chickpea, wheat and mustard. In irrigated agriculture, 
chickpea does not seem at all competitive with either wheat or mustard. In Haryana, 
wheat had the highest revenue till the mid-1980's, after which mustard takes the 
lead. Similar trends are apparent in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. The lower 
revenues of chickpea are consistent with their falling share of irrigated area (Table 
4). The only exception to this trend is Madhya Pradesh, where revenues of irrigated 
chickpea and wheat seem to be the same. Again this is consistent with the increasing 
irrigated chickpea acreage in this state. However, given the profitability levels of 
mustard in other states it would be reasonable to assume that in Madhya Pradesh 
irrigated mustard has greater profitability than irrigated chickpea and wheat. 
In dryland agriculture, the story is somewhat different. In Haryana chickpea 
has lower gross revenues than both wheat and mustard. This would explain the 
falling share of dryland chickpea area in this state (Table 4). In Uttar Pradesh it seems 
that chickpea and wheat have similar gross revenues. In Madhya Pradesh, dryland 
chickpea seems to have a considerable advantage over wheat since 1983. Comparing 
these trends to Table 4, it is clear that dryland chickpea share has fallen only slightly 
in comparison to wheat, indicating its greater competitiveness in unirrigated 
agriculture. However, the jump in mustard's area share is indicative of it's greater 
competitiveness and profitability than either wheat or chickpea under unirrigated 
conditions. Rajasthan too displays trends similar to those in Madhya Pradesh. The 
increase in unirrigated mustard share is reflective of mustard's higher gross 
revenue, which would also explain the falling dryland chickpea and wheat area in 
the state. 
From the above analysis, it is clear that chickpea has lower gross returns per 
hectare than either wheat or mustard under irrigated conditions. The only exception 
to this is Madhya Pradesh, where irrigated chickpea has higher revenues than 
wheat. However, it would seem from mustard's acreage trends and revenue levels 
(in other states) that in Madhya Pradesh mustard has higher returns. One can 
therefore conclude that under the criterion of gross returns, chickpea is not 
competitive in irrigated agriculture. In unirrigated agriculture, chickpea seems to be 
competitive in comparison to wheat in all the states except Haryana. However, the 
recent increases in mustard's gross revenue seem to have offset chickpeas' 
competitiveness in unirrigated agriculture too. In sum, chickpea is not competitive 
in either irrigated or unirrigated agriculture. 
-

Yields and Yield Variability 
Relative yields and yield variability significantly influence the 
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competitiveness of crops. Figures 17 to 24 describe the relative yields of chickpea, 
wheat and mustard in irrigated and dryland agriculture. If one assumes that all 
irrigated wheat is planted to high yielding varieties, one can clearly see the 
differences in the yield levels that the Green Revolution created. Clearly, the higher 
wheat yields were a major factor behind the increased competitiveness of wheat 
relative to chickpea. These figures also reveal that the unirrigated yields of chickpea 
and its competing crops have much wider fluctuations than their irrigated varieties. 
Variability of crop yields playa crucial role in farmer's decision as it makes the 
future uncertain. Yield variability directly translates into profit variability, 
something that risk averse farmers would like to do without. 
Tables 6 and 7 attempt to quantify the relative yield variability of chickpea 
and its competing crops by estimating the coefficient of variation (CY) of their 
yields. In general, one can see that the CV's of irrigated crops are lower than their 
unirrigated counterparts as irrigation removes the dependence on the vagaries of 
rainfall. A comparison of irrigated and unirrigated CV's, shows that in Haryana and 
Uttar Pradesh, chickpea has the highest CY's in both irrigated and unirrigated 
agriculture. Clearly, chickpea cultivation is very risky in these states. In Rajasthan, 
irrigated chickpea has higher CY's than wheat and mustard, while in Madhya 
Pradesh irrigated wheat has higher CY's than chickpea. Unirrigated CY's show that 
wheat has higher yield variation in Madhya Pradesh, though there does not seem to 
be any consistent trend in Rajasthan. 
Summarizing the Factors 
From the previous analysis two different patterns in chickpea agriculture 
emerge - one of the northern wheat growing states of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, 
the other of the central states of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. 
In Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, it was seen that the introduction of modern 
wheat varieties and the high input technique of cultivation associated with it are 
perhaps the most significant factors behind chickpea's decline. The cultivation of 
modem wheat varieties was not compatible with the traditional mixed or sequential 
cropping of chickpea. The higher wheat yields translated into higher profits over its 
competing crops, and with the growth in infrastructure like irrigation to exploit 
wheat's yield potential, increasing amounts of land were sown to HYV wheat. 
Added to this, the higher risk associated with chickpea cultivation in Haryana and 
Uttar Pradesh further hindered its competitiveness. Besides this, chickpea had lower 
revenues compared to irrigated mustard. In dryland agriculture, chickpea's situation 
does not change as it continued to have lower revenues and greater yield risk in 
•comparison to wheat and mustard. 
With all these factors retarding chickpea's competitiveness, lands once sown 
to both chickpea and wheat, were sown solely to wheat. As more land was brought 
under irrigation, chickpea lost acreage in the most productive regions of the Indo­
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Table 6 Estimates of Coefficient of Variation of Irrigated Yields 
State	 Crop 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 
Haryana	 Chickpea 22.6 14.8 24.7 28.1 
Wheat 9.6 5.5 4.0 7.0 
Mustard 8.9 13.2 14.7 16.7 
Uttar Pradesh	 Chickpea 11.6 12.6 11.5 
Wheat 10.4 5.3 5.9 
Madhya Pradesh	 Chickpea 5.4 4.3 5.5 6.6 
Wheat 12.9 15.1 6.5 6.1 
Rajasthan	 Chickpea 13.8 16.4 7.9 13.8 
Wheat 5.6 4.7 7.0 10.5 
Mustard 22.2 10.1 7.9 9.6 
Table 7 Estimates of Coefficient of Variation of Non-irrigated Yields 
State	 Crop 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 
Haryana Chickpea 19.1 21.2 20.6 37.2 
Wheat 17.5 6.0 22.1 25.7 
Mustard 16.0 22.7 25.4 24.0 
Uttar Pradesh Chickpea 17.1 20.2 10.9 
Wheat 11.2 15.5 4.9 
Madhya Pradesh Chickpea 8.4 14.8 14.4 6.9 
Wheat 8.9 9.4 10.7 6.3 
Rajasthan Chickpea 17.3 23.4 4.7 12.2 • 
Wheat 8.2 12.5 8.0 16.0 
Mustard 70.5 33.8 12.0 11.0 
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Gangetic area, especially on large commercial farms (see Table 2). With chickpea 
steadily losing its importance in the region, its cultivation was relegated to marginal 
lands. 
In the main chickpea producing states of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, the 
trends in chickpea production are different from that of the north. This region, 
characterized by poor irrigation and other infrastructure, restricted the rapid 
adoption of HYV wheat. With wheat not having its yield advantage, chickpea 
remained profitable compared to irrigated wheat in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. 
In addition, its lower yield risk in Madhya Pradesh clearly puts it at an advantage in 
this state. However, given the profitability and revenue levels of mustard in other 
states3, it would seem that irrigated mustard is more competitive than irrigated 
chickpea in Madhya Pradesh. In Rajasthan too, irrigated mustard has higher returns 
per hectare making it more competitive than irrigated chickpea. Under dryland 
conditions in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, chickpea, with higher returns than 
wheat and lower yield risk, is certainly more competitive. However, as in Rajasthan, 
where unirrigated mustard has higher returns, it is possible that in Madhya Pradesh 
too dryland mustard is more profitable. Therefore it seems that chickpea is not 
competitive in any of these states under both irrigated and unirrigated conditions. 
The fact that mustard is more competitive than chickpea serves to highlight 
the role of prices in influencing competitiveness among crops. The price of mustard, 
like those of chickpea and wheat, has been influenced by the Government of India's 
agricultural price and trade policy. Not only this, but the prices of inputs to a large 
extent are also regulated by government policy. The effect of such policies on the 
competitiveness between crops will be discussed in the next section. 
4. Government Intervention In Agricultural Markets 
This section briefly describes the various methods with which the 
government of India intervenes in and manipulates the wheat, chickpea and 
mustard markets. Further, the distortion in the factor and product prices resulting 
from this intervention is estimated. In the next section, the effect of this policy 
environment on the relative competitiveness of chickpea, wheat and mustard will 
be quantified. 
Nature of Government Intervention 
The Government of India's agricultural policy influences every aspect of the 
country's agricultural sector. This intervention, by manipulating input and output • 
prices, affects the incentive structure that farmers face. In product markets, this takes 
3 Mustard data for Madhya Pradesh not available. Rajasthan would serve'as a reasonable indication of 
mustard's profitability and gross revenue levels in Madhya Pradesh. 
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the form of setting support prices for crops, procuring marketed surplus to maintain 
government buffer stocks, controlling the movement of foodgrains within the 
country and last but not least, distributing food commodities through its vast public 
distribution network. In addition to this, domestic crop prices and producers are 
shielded from foreign competition by various trade restrictions imposed by the 
government. Similarly, input markets are also subject to intervention. Inputs such 
as fertilizer, irrigation water, electricity and credit are supplied to farmers at 
subsidized rates. The distribution of inputs like fertilizers is also controlled by the 
government. In addition, to protect domestic subsidies, trade in these inputs (e.g. 
fertilizer) is channeled through government agencies. Clearly, government 
intervention in the agricultural sector is pervasive. 
The rationale behind this interventionist policy is a concern about domestic 
prices. A large proportion of India's agricultural exports and imports enter into 
domestic consumption and changes in the prices of these commodities would 
significantly impact domestic prices. Therefore, agricultural imports and exports 
have been regulated to prevent the domestic prices of tradeable commodities from 
rising to levels they would have otherwise achieved. In addition to this, concerns 
regarding the balance of payments, terms of trade and a policy to protect domestic 
agriculture have supported trade regulations. In general, the trade and output price 
policy has "sought to maintain domestic prices at absolute levels that are 
commensurate with average income levels. For another, the trade policy regime has 
sought to impart a stability to domestic prices in the interest of both producers and 
consumers." (Nayyar and Sen 1994, 1188). 
Input subsidies are implemented to promote the use of new inputs, influence 
production of specific crops and as income transfers to the agricultural sector. In 
India, inputs such as irrigation, fertilizer, seed, electricity and credit are provided at 
below market prices. However, non-tradable inputs such as irrigation and electricity 
are often supplied below cost. Though input subsidies were implemented to 
encourage production and input use, of late, subsidizing agriculture has become a 
political tool to win the favor of the farming community. 
Intervention in Output Markets for Wheat. Chickpea and Mustard. 
Of these three crops, wheat is subject to the most significant intervention. It is 
purchased by the Food Corporation of India (FCI) to supply the country's public 
distribution system (PDS) and to maintain buffer stocks in case of droughts. The FCI 
strives to keep the market price of wheat stable. It purchases wheat from the open 
market at pre-announced procurement prices, allowing simultaneous purchases by 
•private traders. However, if the open market price in surplus states (Punjab, 
Haryana) equals the procurement price, then the FCI can bar private traders from 
purchasing wheat.4 In this way it prevents the producer price of wheat from falling 
4 See Gulati and Sharma (1991) 
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below a desired level. On the other hand if the price of wheat is too high, the FCI's 
buffer stocks are used to maintain price stability in the open market. Further, trade 
in wheat is not free. Wheat imports are funneled through the FCI, while exports are 
also subject to quota restrictions and are handled by the Agricultural and Processed 
Food Products Exports Development Authority (APEDA). 
Chickpea and other pulses are also subject to support prices fixed by the 
government. However the open market price of chickpea is higher than the 
procurement price, making the latter redundant. The National Agricultural 
Cooperative Federation (NAFED) is in charge of procuring chickpeas and other 
pulses for the PDS. Exports of chickpea are banned by the government, except in the 
case of consignments imported for re-exportation after processing. Thus, none of the 
domestically produced chickpea can be exported. On the other hand, there are no 
restrictions on imports except for an import duty of around ten per cent (1989 
figure)5. 
Mustard, like other oilseeds, is subject to government support prices. 
However, the open market price has always been higher, making the official price 
redundant. Export of mustard is banned, with few imports taking place. The 
government of India has followed a series of measures to boost oilseed production 
within India. These programs, which were initiated in 1984/85 , included, among 
other things, the setting of support prices for mustard. Currently, mustard and other 
oilseeds are subject to a 'price band', wherein the procurement price of mustard is 
fixed at least 40 per cent above the levels recommended by the Prices Commission 
(Gulati 1990). 
The effect of the government's output price policy on chickpea, wheat and 
mustard is evident from Figures 25 to 30. In the absence of trade restrictions and 
crop price controls farmers would have faced world prices. Hence, the divergence 
between the world and domestic price is a measure of the distortion created in 
domestic crop prices due to government intervention. In these figures two sets of 
domestic prices have been used - procurement and farm harvest prices. 
Procurement prices are pre-announced government prices. They are usually lower 
than the open market price and so do not affect farmer decisions. However, they do 
reflect the policy intentions of the government towards specific crops. Farm harvest 
prices are open market prices that farmers face at the farm gate. The international 
prices for wheat and mustard are price quotations at major centers of world trade 
adjusted for transportation and insurance costs to Indian ports (c.Lf. prices). All 
prices in these figures have been deflated by appropriate deflators. 
On the basis of the comparisons illustrated in these figures, domestic prices of 
wheat and chickpea have been lower than world prices. This is particularly true • 
when procurement prices are considered (Figures 25 to 28). The clear exception to 
this is mustard, whose procurement price is only slightly lower than its 
5 ibid. 
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international price, while its farm harvest price is at par with world prices. In 
addition, the procurement prices of chickpea, wheat and mustard have not kept up 
with their international prices. This clearly reflects the government's policy of 
offering low output prices to agriculture. However, the movements in the farm 
harvest prices seem to be positively correlated with the international prices. Further, 
the sudden increase in the world prices of chickpea, wheat and mustard after the 
mid-1980's is reflective of the devaluation in the rupee, which has continued into 
the 1990's. This has had the effect of making the domestic prices of these crops lower 
than world prices. With the ongoing process of economic liberalization taking place 
in India, further devaluation of the rupee is expected, which in turn would increase 
the gap between the domestic and world prices. 
Government Intervention Through Input Subsidies 
All major agricultural inputs - fertilizer, irrigation, electricity, credit - are 
subsidized by the government. Accessibility and use of these inputs would increase 
productivity, a major concern for the government. The amount of subsidy for non­
traded inputs like irrigation water and electricity are particularly large and the prices 
charged for them often do not even cover the costs of production. 
Irrigation Subsidy: Irrigation subsidies have significantly affected farmer incentives. 
Subsidies on irrigation and electricity used to pump water have caused distortions 
in the cropping pattern in favor of water intensive crops. One study concluded that 
the "subsidyon irrigation through electricity and canal water causes distortion in 
the cropping pattern in favor of water-intensive crops like paddy in Punjab and 
sugarcane in Maharashtra. An ex-post survey of ten major projects in the country 
showed that the cropping pattern that finally emerged in the command areas of 
these projects were significantly different from the ex-ante expectations of the 
project authorities, and that they were tilted heavily in favor of water-intensive 
crops like paddy and sugarcane."(Gulati and Sharma 1991, 227). In addition to this, 
canal water pricing in India is not volumetric, resulting in water-intensive crops 
being subsidized more than others. Among wheat, chickpea and mustard - wheat 
receives the largest irrigation subsidy due to its considerably higher water 
requirements. 
This analysis estimates the net subsidy in irrigating a hectare of chickpea, 
wheat and mustard. For comparison purposes, the actual cost of setting and running 
a deep tube well at the true cost of electricity and credit was used. From this value 
the official water rate6 charged by the respective states was subtracted to arrive at the 
total subsidy on a unit of water. The total subsidy on a hectare of a given crop is then 
calculated by multiplying this value by the total volume of water required for the 
crop's irrigation. The details of this procedure are described in Appendix AS. 
6 The official water rates refer to canal water charges. 
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Table 8 gives the irrigation subsidy computed for chickpea, wheat and 
mustard. Across all the states, the level of subsidies have progressively increased. 
Wheat has received the highest subsidies primarily because it is more water 
intensive than the other two crops. Chickpea received higher irrigation subsidies 
than mustard in all states except Haryana. 
Fertilizer Subsidy: As would be expected, fertilizer subsidies have resulted in 
excessive fertilizer use. "In areas where productivity is sagging farmers tend to 
compensate by applying higher doses of fertilizer rather than managing fertilizer 
and other inputs more efficiently. This substitution of 'management' by higher and 
higher doses of cheap fertilizer can be stopped through widespread extension and 
more judicious pricing." (Gulati and Sharma 1991, 227). Though fertilizers were 
heavily subsidized in the recent past the government has been cutting down on 
fertilizer subsidies. 
To calculate the fertilizer subsidy the cost of importing NPK fertilizer has 
been estimated by computing the import value of Urea (46% N), Diammonium­
Phosphate (DAP, 18-46-0), and Muriate of Potash (60% K20) fertilizer at the national 
level with their relative consumption levels acting as weights. The import value 
has been adjusted for port handling charges and dealer margins. The domestic cost 
of NPK fertilizer has been estimated using domestic prices but with the same 
weights. The details of the estimation are given in Appendix A6. 
Figure 31 illustrates the domestic price of NPK fertilizer in comparison to its 
international price. The difference between the two prices reflects the extent to 
which the domestic fertilizer price has been distorted by government policy. The 
jump in international prices after 1987/88 is due to the devaluation of the rupee. 
However, it seems that after a lag of a few years, domestic prices are catching up with 
international ones. This is due to the government reduction in fertilizer subsidies. 
By encouraging the excessive use of inputs, input subsidies have also caused 
environmental degradation. Excessive irrigation has resulted in salinity, water­
logging and the depletion of groundwater. Similarly, excessive fertilizer use has 
contaminated the water, in addition to having adverse effects on the soil. Besides 
this, the fiscal strain of providing such heavy subsidies is tremendous. In 1989-90 the 
fertilizer subsidy amounted to Rs 4,6017 crore8 ($2.8 billion9) while losses to state 
electricity boards in supplying subsidized electricity to the agricultural sector 
exceeded Rs. 3,000 crore ($1.8 billion). The total investment in irrigation projects 
(major and medium) was Rs. 61, 513 crore ($36.9 billion) at 1988-89 prices, with 
revenues from these projects inadequate to cover even recurring expenses. The 
implications of the Indian government's input and output pricing on chickpea 
•competitiveness will be considered in the next section. 
7 See Gulati and Sharma (1991) 
8 1 crore = 10,000,000. 
9 At 1989/90 exchange rate. 
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Table 8 Irrigation Subsidy (Rs/Ha) 
State	 Crop 1980/81 1985/86 1992/93 
Haryana	 Chickpea 110 258 712 
Wheat 448 919 2365 
Mustard 373 779 2027 
Uttar Pradesh	 Chickpea 276 664 1855 
Wheat 376 857 2331 
Mustard 27 184 666 
Madhya Pradesh	 Chickpea 448 900 2290 
Wheat 568 1150 2936 
Mustard 195 417 1097 
Rajasthan	 Chickpea 418 871 2260 
Wheat 556 1137 2924 
Mustard 183 405 1085 
-

Source: See Appendix A5 
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5. Agricultural Price Policy and Chickpea Competitiveness 
The aim of this section is to evaluate the effect of the distortion in product 
and factor prices discussed in the previous section on chickpea competitiveness. 
First, the pattern of incentives generated by government policy towards chickpea, 
wheat and mustard producers will be examined. This involves estimating the 
following Coefficients of Protection; Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC), the 
Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) and the Effective Subsidy Coefficient (ESC). 
Second, it will attempt to identify which among chickpea, wheat and mustard is the 
most efficient to produce, indicating comparative advantage. This requires the 
estimation of Net Economic Benefit (NEB) of chickpea, wheat and mustard 
production. All the estimation procedures mentioned are as described in Tsakok 
(1990). 
Theoretical Framework: The Role of Prices and Opportunity Cost 
The product and input prices that farmers face indicate two things. First, 
relative product and input prices reflect relative incentives for crop production and 
input use. Whether these incentives actually affect production and consumption 
decisions will depend on their respective price elasticities. Nonetheless, lower input 
prices induce increased use of inputs, while increased output prices would be an 
incentive to increase production. Secondly, prices which reflect the scarcity value of 
resources are necessary for the efficient allocation of resources in the economy. 
Opportunity cost pricing involves pricing a resource or commodity at its 
'true' value to the economy. It provides a benchmark price to which the prices faced 
by farmers can be evaluated. Prices which consistently diverge from opportunity 
costs are said to be distorted10. Comparing a price of a commodity with its 
opportunity cost reveals the following. First, it will show the extent of tax or subsidy 
on the good. Secondly, prices which consistently diverge from opportunity costs 
entail inefficient resource use and consequently constitute an inefficient price 
structure. 
In assessing the opportunity cost of a commodity, it first needs to be identified 
as a tradable or non-tradable good. The opportunity cost of a tradable commodity is 
given by its border price, which is simply the world price (i.e. import or export parity 
price) of the commodity in question converted into the domestic currency at an 
appropriate exchange rate. The border price represents the opportunity cost of 
producing a tradable good, since the alternative to domestic production is 
importation. If an export, the border price is the domestic price at the point of export 
(port, airport), free on board the carrier (the f.o.b. price). If an import, the border price • 
10 Government policy need not be the only cause of price distortion. Such distortions can exist due to lack 
of competitive markets (monopolistic elements etc.). Indeed, government policy might help correct the 
distortion in prices. 
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is the international price (in domestic currency) of the commodity at the national 
border and includes cost, insurance and freight (the c.i.f. price). 
A tradeable commodity can have two sets of border prices; one under the 
importable hypothesis and the other under exportable hypothesis. The former uses 
the import parity price and the latter the export parity price. However, since India's 
domestic production of chickpea and mustard are insufficient to meet domestic 
demand, while wheat production just manages to satisfy domestic consumption, 
border prices of these crops have been estimated under the importable hypothesis. 
In addition, India is not a frequent exporter of these commodities. 
The opportunity cost of nontradeable commodities is given by the domestic 
shadow price. This is the value of the resource or commodity in its next best 
alternative use. For instance, land is not a tradable commodity and its shadow price 
is evaluated by the value of its contribution to its best alternative use. If there is no 
alternative use, the shadow price is zero. If the contribution of the nontradable in 
the alternative use has a higher value, then the shadow price is positive and is 
greater than its actual observed price. 
Prices and Exchange Rate Used 
Two sets of producer prices have been used in this analysis. The first is the 
procurement price set by the government. The use of procurement prices are 
important for the following reasons. First, in Indian data, the procurement price 
takes into account the quality of output which is not the case with published open 
market prices (e.g. farm harvest prices). Thus, the price offered by the government 
for fair and average quality (FAQ) produce, makes it comparable to the imported 
quality of grain. Secondly, the government set prices reflect the policy (i.e. 
intentions) towards producers of particular crop. 
The second set of producer prices used are the farm harvest prices. These 
represent the open market prices that farmers actually face at the farm gate. 
However, these prices are published without reference to the quality of the 
commodities they represent and so create problems in comparing them with 
international prices. However, they are closer to the prices that farmers face. 
The coefficients of protection and comparative advantage are estimated on 
the import hypothesis, and the international prices used are the c.i.f. prices of the 
respective commodities published by the United Nation's Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO). 
• 
For estimating the NPC, EPC and ESC the official exchange rate is used. 
However, for the NEB estimations both the official exchange rate and the black­
market rate has been used. In addition, the rupee has been undergoing gradual 
devaluation through the 1980's with a major devaluation occurring in mid-1991 as 
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part of the economic liberalization agenda. The time series used in the present 
analysis covers the period before and after the rupee devaluation in mid 1991. 
Coefficients of Protection 
Coefficients of Protection indicate the relative incentives for a specific crop by 
determining the implied structure of taxation or subsidy on it. The three main 
coefficients of protection being considered in this analysis are (a) Nominal 
Protection Coefficient (NPC), (b) Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC), and (c) 
Effective Subsidy Coefficient (ESC). This section will describe the method of 
estimating the various protection coefficients and then give the actual estimates. 
Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC) 
The nominal protection coefficient, the simplest of the protection coefficients, 
is the ratio of the domestic price of a crop I commodity to its border price. 
d p.
1 
NPCi=b 
p.
1 
where, 
d 
Pi = domestic (procurement) price of commodity i. 
b 
Pi = border price of commodity i-Foreign price x Exchange rate. 
The NPC can have a range of values. An NPC > I, indicates that domestic prices of 
the commodity are greater than the border price and is indicative of positive 
protection. It means that domestic producers are receiving a higher price due to 
government policy than they would have without it. The opposite holds true for 
NPC < 1. When NPC =1, the structure of protection is neutral and producers are 
facing border prices. The greater the divergence of the NPC from unity, the greater 
the effect of government policy on the incentive structure for production or 
consumption of the commodity. However, the most important thing for the 
purpose of this study is not the absolute level of divergence, but the relative 
divergence among crops. The relative divergence will reveal the relative incentives 
­
for production over time. To make the NPCs reflective of the protective structure of 
government policy, the domestic and border prices must represent prices which 
producers actually face. This usually involves adjustment in the border price. 
Appendix A7 describe the adjustments made in arriving at the NPC estimates. 
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NPC Estimates - Table 9 and 9A state the Nominal Protection Coefficients of 
chickpea, wheat and mustard. The NPC values in Table 9A are generally higher 
than Table 9 due to the former using farm harvest prices which are higher than the 
procurement prices used in Table 9. 
A survey of the NPC values of these three crops across the states reveals the 
following: 
1) Across all regions, mustard has had higher NPCs than wheat and chickpea. This is 
true of both the procurement price (Table 9) and the open market (Table 9A) 
estimates. This indicates that relative to wheat and chickpea, mustard producers 
were given a higher degree of protection. In addition, government policy was 
focused on providing greater protection to mustard producers. 
2) Most of mustard's NPCs are greater than unity indicating that mustard 
farmers in India received higher prices due to government intervention than they 
would have without. 
3) Wheat and chickpea generally had NPCs less than unity across all states, 
indicating that producers of these crops received lower prices than they would have 
in the absence of government intervention. This if true of both the open market 
(Table 9A) and the government price (Table 9) estimates. Thus, in terms of output 
prices, producers of wheat and chickpea producers were disprotected (taxed). 
4) Some significant regional trends appear in comparing the NPCs of wheat and 
chickpea. In the wheat producing state of Haryana, the NPCs of wheat are slightly 
higher than chickpea till the late 1980's, after which chickpea has higher values. 
Moving eastward into Uttar Pradesh, wheat seems to have received slightly more 
protection than chickpea as far as the procurement price estimates are concerned 
(Table 9). However, the open market estimates (Table 9A) indicate that chickpea 
received slightly greater protection. In the major chickpea producing states of 
Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, the NPCs of chickpea and wheat reverse their 
trend. The NPC values of chickpea are higher. This is true for both the procurement 
and open market price estimates. 
5) Across all crops and regions, the NPC values tend to decline, especially after 
1989/90. This is due to the process of economic liberalization which included the 
devaluation of the Indian rupee. This raised the international price in comparison 
to the domestic price, making these crops disprotected. 
•From the above results it is clear that in the major wheat producing states of 
Haryana and Uttar Pradesh (to a lesser extent) wheat cultivators, till the late 1980's, 
received greater protection than chickpea producers. This is especially true when the 
government set procurement prices are considered, indicating an intentional price 
bias towards wheat and against chickpea. Further, in the major chickpea producing 
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Table 9 Nominal Protection Coefficients (NPC) - Procurement Price Estimates. 
State Crop 1980-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 
Haryana Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
0.61 
0.88 
1.22 
0.66 
0.77 
1.23 
0.59 
0.85 
1.31 
0.51 
0.73 
1.06 
0.72 
0.65 
0.84 
0.47 
0.69 
0.97 
0.56 
0.91 
1.29 
0.51 
0.82 
1.57 
0.40 
0.47 
0.90 
0.41 
0.39 
0.91 
0.52 
0.44 
0.96 
0.32 
0.32 
0.63 
0.34 
0.27 
0.59 
w 
\0 
Uttar Pradesh Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
0.62 
0.72 
1.21 
0.66 
0.63 
1.22 
0.60 
0.66 
1.30 
0.52 
0.58 
1.05 
0.73 
0.53 
0.84 
0.47 
0.54 
0.96 
0.57 
0.65 
1.27 
0.52 
0.58 
1.53 
0.40 
0.37 
0.88 
0.41 
0.32 
0.89 
0.52 
0.35 
0.95 
0.33 
0.27 
0.62 
0.34 
0.23 
0.58 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
0.70 
0.73 
0.99 
0.76 
0.64 
1.00 
0.69 
0.68 
1.03 
0.59 
0.59 
0.86 
0.88 
0.54 
0.72 
0.54 
0.55 
0.79 
0.68 
0.68 
0.98 
0.63 
0.60 
1.10 
0.47 
0.38 
0.71 
0.49 
0.33 
0.72 
0.66 
0.36 
0.75 
0.38 
0.28 
0.52 
0.40 
0.24 
0.59 
Rajasthan Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
0.71 
0.73 
1.20 
0.76 
0.64 
1.21 
0.69 
0.67 
1.28 
0.59 
0.59 
1.04 
0.88 
0.54 
0.83 
0.54 
0.55 
0.95 
0.69 
0.67 
1.25 
0.64 
0.59 
1.50 
0.48 
0.38 
0.87 
0.49 
0.33 
0.88 
0.66 
0.35 
0.93 
0.39 
0.27 
0.61 
0.41 
0.24 
0.58 
Source: See Appendix A7. 
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Table 9A Nominal Protection Coefficients (NPC) - Farm Harvest Price Estimates 
State Crop 1980-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 
Haryana Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
1.22 
0.94 
1.78 
0.83 
0.84 
1.56 
0.70 
0.92 
1.65 
0.72 
0.79 
1.09 
1.32 
0.69 
0.86 
0.67 
0.72 
1.25 
0.77 
1.00 
2.47 
0.99 
0.97 
2.78 
0.72 
0.52 
1.28 
0.70 
0.40 
1.31 
0.81 
0.48 
1.53 
0.48 
0.36 
0.88 
~ 
0 
Uttar Pradesh Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
1.07 
0.74 
1.99 
0.72 
0.66 
1.30 
0.58 
0.74 
1.53 
0.62 
0.56 
1.45 
1.08 
0.52 
0.91 
0.72 
0.55 
1.00 
0.65 
0.66 
1.85 
0.79 
0.65 
2.63 
0.63 
0.43 
1.04 
0.61 
0.31 
1.06 
0.73 
0.41 
1.34 
0.41 
0.32 
0.79 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
1.37 
0.95 
1.54 
0.77 
0.74 
1.13 
0.63 
0.89 
1.16 
0.70 
0.69 
1.16 
1.47 
0.60 
0.77 
0.79 
0.68 
0.79 
0.81 
0.81 
1.39 
0.95 
0.79 
1.76 
0.81 
0.58 
0.86 
0.70 
0.39 
0.82 
0.83 
0.46 
1.10 
0.45 
0.38 
0.68 
Rajasthan Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
1.41 
0.86 
2.04 
0.95 
0.79 
1.54 
0.77 
0.78 
1.26 
0.73 
0.68 
1.37 
1.48 
0.63 
0.76 
0.76 
0.68 
1.02 
0.88 
0.79 
2.04 
1.08 
0.82 
2.50 
0.83 
0.54 
1.05 
0.76 
0.37 
1.05 
0.92 
0.49 
1.35 
0.48 
0.38 
0.82 
Source: See Appendix A7. 
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states of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan both the government's price policy and the 
open market prices favored chickpea over wheat cultivators. Finally, between 
chickpea, wheat and mustard, mustard producers were the most favored both by 
government policy and open market prices. 
Though the NPC coefficients indicate the direction of relative incentives, 
their interpretation needs to be taken with some caution. First, in India, the 
government follows a policy of low input and low output prices. Thus, under such a 
policy, a crop that might appear to be taxed (disprotected) according to the NPC 
estimates may not actually be so when input subsidies are taken into consideration. 
The next two sections deal with this problem. Secondly, the exchange rate used here 
is the official exchange rate, which is overvalued. This tends to give higher NPC 
values and so underestimates the degree of taxation. However, the relative NPC 
levels will remain the same. 
Effective Protection Coefficients CEPC) 
Government policy not only affects output prices but input prices as well. 
Altering input prices also affects the incentives for crop production. NPCs, which 
were previously estimated, focus only on output prices, while EPCs take into 
account distortions in both output prices and the cost of traded inputs. Thus the 
focus of EPCs is broader than NPCs. 
where, 
d p.
1 
a··IJ 
d p.
J 
b p.
1 
b p.
J 
Value Added in Domestic Prices 
= ... (2)Value Added in Border Prices 
=domestic price of output i. 
=units of input j per unit of output i. 
=domestic price of input j. 
=border price of output i. 
• 
=border price of input j. 
The EPC of a commodity is the ratio of the value added in domestic prices to 
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value added in border prices. Value added refers to the value that is added to the 
output through the production process, over and above the value of purchased 
inputs. By subtracting the contribution of traded inputs, it gives a measure of the 
returns to primary factors (or resources) of production; land, labor, capital - and to 
non-traded inputs. In this analysis, value added is estimated using the Simple 
Corden Method11. 
Estimating Value Added - To estimate EPCs, information about the production 
structure of the crops is needed. Further, the inputs that go into the production 
process need to be classified into primary factors of production (land, labor, capital 
assets) and intermediate inputs (fertilizer, electricity, water) which are used up in 
the production process. These categories are further divided into tradables and non­
tradables. The classification of inputs according to the above scheme is described 
below. In this analysis, fertilizer and seed are considered as the only traded inputs. 
The import value of NPK fertilizer at the national level is estimated in Appendix 
A6. The import price of seed has been assumed to be equal to the border price of 
their respective outputs. This was mainly due to lack of information regarding the 
import price of seed. For a justification of this see (Gulati, Hanson and Pursell, 1990, 
26). 
Table 10 Classification of Production Inputs for EPC Calculation. 
Traded Intermediate Non-traded Intermediate Primary Factors 
Fertilizer Manure Human Labor 
Seeds Electricity 
Irrigation 
Animal Labor 
Machine Labor 
Farm implements 
Farm buildings 
Significance of EPC Coefficients - An EPC >1 means that domestic producers are 
receiving greater returns to the primary factors (land, labor, capital) and to non­
traded inputs than without intervention. This is indicative of positive protection. If 
EPC < 1, then producers could have received higher returns if they faced border 
prices rather than domestic prices on inputs and outputs. 
EPCs can also take on negative values. Negativity in the EPCs are indicative 
of basic flaws in the decision to produce the good domestically under the prevalent 
cost structure and productivity. Negative EPCs occur if either the value added in 
domestic prices (the numerator) is negative or the value added in border prices (the 
denominator) is negative. If the former is the case, then production is unprofitable 
and producers are in business only due to government subsidy. If the latter is the 
•case, then the economy is losing foreign exchange by the domestic production of the 
commodity. This is because the cost of traded inputs exceeds the gross value of 
lIIn Simple Corden Method :Value Added = Value of Output - cost of traded intermediary inputs. (see 
Tsakok (1990) for details on other methods.) 
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output at border prices. 
A comparison of EPCs across crops and over time better reflects relative 
incentives for production, and the relative efficiency of production than NPCs. 
However, they are not indicative of absolute incentives or absolute efficiency. 
EPC Estimates - Tables 11 and 11A describe the regional EPCs. The following can be 
inferred from the EPC estimates: 
1) All EPCs are positive indicating that production of these three crops is profitable. 
2) Further, the EPC values are almost equal to their corresponding NPCs. This 
indicates that traded inputs contribute very little to the value added of these crops. 
Consequently, government manipulation of the price of traded inputs such as 
fertilizer and/ or seed is of little consequence for the relative incentives of these 
crops. Further, they suggest that the bulk of production incentives comes from 
protection or disprotection accorded to primary and non-tradable inputs. 
The EPC estimates do not reveal much more than the NPC values about the 
relative incentives given to the crops under study. A deeper analysis would involve 
the subsidies given to non-traded inputs. This is what will be considered in the next 
section. 
Effective Subsidy Coefficient (ESC) 
The Effective Subsidy Coefficient widens the focus of the EPC even further by 
explicitly adjusting for subsidies on the primary factors of production (land, labor 
and capital) and on non-traded inputs. For instance, government policy to promote 
the production of a crop might involve the supply of free irrigation water. This 
subsidy, which is not explicitly captured by the EPC, is explicit in the ESC. 
ESC = ValueAdded inDomestic Prices ± Net Subsidy on Primary Inputs 
..(3)
Value Added in Border Prices 
Thus the ESC is just the EPC adjusted for net subsidies on primary inputs. The ESC 
is an attempt to capture the entire structure of protection of a commodity within the 
economy. 
-
The main subsidies on primary and non-tradable factors of production in 
India are in the form of electricity subsidies, irrigation subsidies and credit subsidies. 
Taxes paid on land are insignificant, if not non-existent and so have been ignored. 
Also, subsidies on fertilizer and seed, the tradable inputs, have already been 
accounted for in the EPC estimates. 
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Table 11 Effective Protection Coefficients (EPC) - Procurement Price Estimates 
State Crop 1980-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 
:t 
Haryana 
Uttar Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
0.61 
0.89 
1.25 
0.62 
0.71 
1.23 
0.66 
0.76 
1.25 
0.66 
0.61 
1.24 
0.59 
0.84 
1.33 
0.60 
0.64 
1.31 
0.51 
0.72 
1.06 
0.52 
0.56 
1.05 
0.72 
0.65 
0.85 
0.73 
0.52 
0.84 
0.47 
0.69 
0.98 
0.47 
0.53 
0.97 
0.56 
0.91 
1.30 
0.57 
0.63 
1.28 
0.51 
0.82 
1.66 
0.52 
0.55 
1.57 
0.40 
0.45 
0.91 
0.40 
0.35 
0.89 
0.41 
0.37 
0.93 
0.41 
0.30 
0.90 
0.52 
0.42 
0.99 
0.52 
0.33 
0.95 
0.32 
0.30 
0.63 
0.33 
0.25 
0.62 
0.34 
0.25 
0.58 
0.34 
0.21 
0.58 
Madhya Pradesh Chickpea 
Wheat 
0.70 
0.73 
0.76 
0.63 
0.69 
0.67 
0.59 
0.58 
0.88 
0.53 
0.54 
0.55 
0.68 
0.67 
0.63 
0.58 
0.46 
0.36 
0.48 
0.31 
0.66 
0.34 
0.38 
0.26 
0.39 
0.22 
Rajasthan Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
0.71 
0.72 
1.20 
0.76 
0.63 
1.21 
0.69 
0.66 
1.29 
0.59 
0.57 
1.04 
0.89 
0.53 
0.83 
0.54 
0.54 
0.95 
0.69 
0.66 
1.25 
0.64 
0.58 
1.52 
0.48 
0.37 
0.87 
0.49 
0.32 
0:89 
0.67 
0.35 
0.94 
0.39 
0.26 
0.61 
0.40 
0.22 
0.57 
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Table IIA Effective Protection Coefficients (EPC) - Farm Harvest Price Estimates 
State Crop 1980-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 
~ 
01 
Haryana 
Uttar Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
1.22 
0.96 
1.84 
1.07 
0.73 
2.06 
0.83 
0.84 
1.61 
0.72 
0.65 
1.33 
0.70 
0.92 
1.68 
0.58 
0.72 
1.55 
0.72 
0.78 
1.09 
0.62 
0.54 
1.46 
1.32 
0.69 
0.87 
1.08 
0.51 
0.92 
0.67 
0.73 
1.27 
0.72 
0.54 
1.01 
0.77 
1.01 
2.54 
0.65 
0.64 
1.89 
0.99 
1.00 
3.02 
0.79 
0.63 
2.73 
0.72 
0.50 
1.33 
0.63 
0.41 
1.05 
0.70 
0.39 
1.35 
0.61 
0.29 
1.07 
0.81 
0.47 
1.60 
0.73 
0.39 
1.36 
0.48 
0.34 
0.91 
0.41 
0.30 
0.80 
Madhya Pradesh Chickpea 
Wheat 
1.38 
0.96 
0.76 
0.74 
0.63 
0.89 
0.70 
0.68 
1.48 
0.59 
0.79 
0.68 
0.81 
0.80 
0.95 
0.78 
0.81 
0.58 
0.71 
0.38 
0.83 
0.45 
0.44 
0.37 
Rajasthan Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
1.41 
0.87 
2.05 
0.95 
0.79 
1.55 
0.77 
0.77 
1.26 
0.73 
0.67 
1.37 
1.49 
0.63 
0.76 
0.76 
0.68 
1.03 
0.88 
0.78 
2.05 
1.09 
0.82 
2.57 
0.83 
0.53 
1.06 
0.76 
0.36 
1.05 
0.92 
0.48 
1.37 
0.48 
0.37 
0.83 
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Of all the agricultural subsidies, perhaps irrigation is the most significant. 
This analysis has tried to capture the combined effect of all these subsidies on the 
cost of a unit of water (see Section 4). Though this method does not capture the 
entire subsidy given to the agricultural sector (like subsidized machinery, fuel, 
electricity for threshing and other purposes), it does capture a significant part of it, 
especially the most important ones for agricultural production. 
ESC Estimates - Table 12 and 12A describe the ESC estimates, calculated per hectare 
of cultivated area. The following can be observed from a survey of the ESC values: 
I} The differences in the relative incentives have become much greater with the 
inclusion of subsidies on primary factors of production. This indicates that primary 
factors and inputs of production are heavily subsidized in Indian agriculture. 
2} Mustard, in keeping with its trend in NPCs and EPCs, has the highest ESCs 
among its competing crops. In addition its ESC values are much higher than its NPC 
and EPC values. This indicates that mustard not only had a favorable output price 
policy, but that its producers received considerable input subsidies too. Clearly, 
government policy is strongly biased towards encouraging mustard production in 
India. 
3} Relative incentives between wheat and chickpea change significantly when input 
subsidies are involved. In Haryana, wheat, on average, seems to have received 
neutral protection before 1988/89, with its ESC fluctuating around unity. However 
chickpea seems to have been disprotected, with ESCs lower than unity. This is true 
of both the government prices (Table 12) and the open market prices (Table 12A). 
This clearly indicates a policy and incentive bias against chickpea producers in 
Haryana. In Uttar Pradesh, the ESCs of chickpea seem higher than wheat, especially 
when farm harvest prices are concerned (Table 12A). However, the difference in the 
ratios is not that large indicating that chickpea received only slightly more 
protection. 
4} In Madhya Pradesh, between 1980/81 and 1989/90, both wheat and chickpea were 
positively protected (ESC greater than unity). This is especially true of the open 
market prices (Table 12A). Also, the ESC values of chickpea are generally higher, 
especially for open market prices, indicating that chickpea producers received greater 
effective protection than wheat producers. 
5} In Rajasthan, ESC values of chickpea are all greater than unity indicating that 
chickpea producers are positively protected. Wheat, with ESC ratios around unity, 
had neutral protection. This indicates that chickpea farmers received a higher degree 
of effective protection relative to wheat. • 
Reviewing the regional estimates of ESCs, it is clear that when all input and 
output subsidies are taken into consideration (Le. effective incentives), certain crops 
have strong regional incentives for their production. Mustard seems to have 
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Table 12 Effective Subsidy Coefficients (ESC) - Procurement Price Estimates 
State Crop 1980-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 
!oJ:>. 
'1 
Haryana Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
0.70 
1.03 
1.53 
0.74 
0.89 
1.51 
0.70 
1.01 
1.62 
0.61 
0.89 
1.32 
0.86 
0.81 
1.06 
0.56 
0.88 
1.27 
0.70 
1.20 
1.74 
0.66 
1.14 
2.26 
0.53 
0.65 
1.28 
0.51 
0.53 
1.24 
0.70 
0.63 
1.43 
0.47 
0.47 
1.00 
0.47 
0.40 
0.99 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
0.78 
0.86 
1.26 
0.80 
0.75 
1.28 
0.75 
0.80 
1.38 
0.66 
0.73 
1.12 
0.98 
0.69 
0.90 
0.66 
0.74 
1.05 
0.85 
0.93 
1.43 
0.84 
0.87 
1.79 
0.70 
0.59 
1.03 
0.68 
0.50 
1.02 
0.94 
0.59 
1.12 
0.63 
0.47 
0.76 
0.66 
0.42 
0.74 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
1.07 
1.13 
1.07 
0.98 
1.01 
1.06 
0.92 
0.99 
1.46 
0.95 
0.94 
1.03 
1.23 
1.32 
1.27 
1.30 
1.01 
0.90 
0.97 
0.74 
1.40 
0.88 
0.90 
0.72 
0.93 
0.65 
Rajasthan Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
0.99 
0.95 
1.33 
1.02 
0.83 
1.33 
0.99 
0.90 
1.42 
0.90 
0.83 
1.17 
1.39 
0.77 
0.95 
0.90 
0.82 
0.97 
1.20 
1.03 
1.49 
1.26 
0.99 
1.86 
0.99 
0.67 
1.11 
0.98 
0.56 
1.14 
1.49 
0.65 
1.14 
1.01 
0.52 
1.26 
1.07 
0.50 
0.81 
I 
Table 12A Effective Subsidy Coefficients (ESC) - Farm Harvest Price Estimates 
State Crop 1980-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 
.+>­
00 
Haryana 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
1.30 
1.10 
2.14 
1.23 
0.88 
2.09 
0.91 
0.98 
1.87 
0.85 
0.78 
1.37 
0.80 
1.09 
1.97 
0.73 
0.88 
1.62 
0.82 
0.96 
1.35 
0.76 
0.71 
1.53 
1.45 
0.85 
1.08 
1.33 
0.68 
0.98 
0.76 
0.92 
1.56 
0.91 
0.75 
1.10 
0.91 
1.30 
3.01 
0.93 
0.93 
2.05 
1.14 
1.32 
3.67 
1.11 
0.95 
2.96 
0.85 
0.71 
1.70 
0.93 
0.65 
1.19 
0.80 
0.55 
1.68 
0.88 
0.49 
1.19 
0.99 
0.68 
2.06 
1.15 
0.65 
1.53 
0.62 
0.51 
1.28 
0.72 
0.53 
0.94 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
1.76 
1.35 
1.07 
1.09 
0.95 
1.28 
1.04 
1.09 
2.08 
1.00 
1.20 
1.16 
1.36 
1.46 
1.60 
1.49 
1.36 
1.10 
1.19 
0.80 
1.56 
0.98 
0.95 
0.83 
Rajasthan Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
1.71 
1.09 
2.19 
1.21 
0.98 
1.67 
1.07 
1.00 
1.39 
1.04 
0.93 
1.51 
2.01 
0.87 
0.87 
1.12 
0.96 
0.89 
1.39 
1.16 
2.30 
1.71 
1.23 
2.92 
1.35 
0.84 
1.29 
1.24 
0.61 
1.33 
1.73 
0.79 
1.30 
1.09 
0.63 
1.70 
I 
received the greatest incentives across all regions, a clear outcome of government 
policy to promote the production of this crop. Wheat has greater incentives than 
chickpea in Haryana. In Uttar Pradesh chickpea seems to have received slightly 
more protection than wheat. In Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh chickpea was 
positively protected and received much stronger incentives for its production than 
wheat. 
Coefficients of Comparative Advantage 
The coefficients of protection described in the previous section measure the 
relative incentives given to wheat, chickpea and mustard due to government 
intervention. In estimating coefficients of comparative advantage, the analysis 
attempts to judge which crop yields the greatest return to the Indian economy, i.e. 
which of these three crops India has comparative advantage in production. This 
entails finding out which production activity (wheat, chickpea or mustard) is the 
most efficient (uses resources most productively). Thus, coefficients of comparative 
advantage are measures of relative efficiency. Coefficients of protection and 
comparative advantage are complementary in that together they indicate what the 
relative incentives in production are and where efficiency in the same activities lie. 
Estimating comparative advantage involves assuming the free trade of goods 
internationally and the absence of government intervention. All inputs and 
outputs are valued at their opportunity cost. Using the equilibrium exchange rate, 
the value added in domestic and border price~ needs to be estimated12, by subtracting 
the cost of traded inputs from the output price. This value added is an indicator of 
benefit as it shows how much the economy would save (if an import substitute) or 
earn (if an export) given foreign trade opportunities open to the economy. After 
this, all domestic resources need to be estimated at their shadow prices, which 
would give the cost of domestic resources. In comparing the benefit with the cost 
(i.e. cost-benefit), the relative efficiency of production among the activities can be 
evaluated. Production activities with the greatest relative benefit are relatively the 
most efficient. 
Net Economic Benefit (NEB) 
Estimating NEB is akin to estimating the economic profitability of producing 
a crop. It gives the net economic returns per unit of cropped land in the presence of 
free trade and the absence of input subsidies. Economic profitability is different from 
private profitability, as in the former the prices of all inputs and outputs are valued 
•at their opportunity cost. Profit maximizing farmers will allocate their land to a crop 
on the basis of the relative private profitability of that and competing crops. 
However, as explained, this private profitability calculation is based on the prices 
12In this analysis, both the official exchange rate and the black-market exchange rate has been used. 
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that they actually face, which might be distorted by government policy. Thus in 
estimating the economic profitability of producing a crop(s), the profit in a distortion 
free, open economic environment is calculated. This value is also a measure of 
comparative advantage and hence efficiency. Therefore, from among a set of 
competing crops the crop with the highest 'economic profitability' is the one which 
will be produced by profit maximizing farmers in the absence of government 
intervention. This crop will also be the most efficient one to produce with all 
resources being put to the most productive use. The resulting cropping pattern will 
be also be most profitable socially. The details of estimating the NEB are described in 
Appendix AB. 
5UIn of traded 5UIll of domestic resources andNet EconOInic Border price of 
inputs at border - nontraded inputs valued atBenefit output 
prices domestic shadow prices 
Significance of NEB - A ranking of NEBs indicates the level of efficiency for 
domestic production or international competitiveness. Thus in taking the difference 
in economic prices, the NEB is a measure of economic profitably. NEB> a indicate 
efficient use of resources as the economy is earning a profit through domestic 
production. It also indicates international competitiveness and comparative 
advantage in production. The converse is reflected in a NEB less than unity. 
Estimation of NEB - Data used to calculate the NEBs were taken from cost of 
cultivation data published by the Government of India. Calculating the NEBs 
requires that all inputs, both traded and non-traded, be valued at their shadow 
prices. Traded inputs (fertilizer and seed) have been so valued as part of the £PC 
estimation. Ideally, NEB estimation requires the use of the equilibrium exchange 
rate for that represents the true opportunity cost of foreign exchange. In this 
analysis, two sets of exchange rates have been used - the official exchange rate and 
the black-market exchange rate. The equilibrium exchange rate is assumed to lie 
between these two rates. Thus, the NEB estimates from official exchange rate can be 
seen as the lower bound while that of the black-market rate as the upper bound, 
with the true NEB values lying in-between. As far as non-traded inputs are 
concerned, the shadow price of irrigation water has been estimated as part of the ESC 
calculation. However, for the NEB estimation the strong assumption has been made 
that other non-traded input prices (interest, depreciation etc. ) as reported in the cost 
of cultivation statistics are equal to their shadow prices. In this analysis the shadow 
price of land has been ignored13 
NEB Estimates - Tables 13 , 13A, 13B and 13C list the NEBs for chickpea, wheat and 
• 
13 Though the opportunity cost of land could have been taken at its rental value under the assumption of 
competitive markets, the data source indicated that rental value was taken to be the prevailing 
village rates or the rates reported by the farmer. Further, the government has laws regarding fair 
rents. In consideration of this, the opportunity cost of land was excluded from the estimation. Thus, the 
estimated NEB will reflect economic profit due to the exclusion of the shadow price of land. 
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mustard in terms of rupees per hectare. Out of these four estimates, the first two 
estimates use the official exchange rate, while the latter two use the black-market 
exchange rate. Even though these NEB values fluctuate, the following trends are 
apparent. 
1) In Haryana, wheat has the highest NEB values followed by chickpea and then 
mustard. Further, in all four estimates (Table 13 to 13C), wheat and chickpea have 
positive NEB values while mustard generally has negative NEB values. This 
indicates that Haryana has a comparative advantage in wheat and chickpea 
production and a comparative disadvantage in mustard production. However, the 
most efficient crop to produce is wheat, while mustard production results in 
inefficient resource allocation. 
2) In Uttar Pradesh all the four estimates indicate that, in general, prior to 1987/88 
chickpea has the highest NEB values followed by wheat and mustard. After this 
period, wheat has the highest NEB values followed by mustard and chickpea. 
Therefore, for the whole period (i.e. 1980/81 to 1992/93) it can be stated that wheat 
had the highest NEB values, though nothing specific can be said about chickpea and 
mustard. Further, the NEB values of all three crops, in general, are positive. Thus, 
Uttar Pradesh has comparative advantage in wheat, chickpea and mustard 
production. However, wheat production leads to the greatest efficiency. 
3) In Madhya Pradesh, all the estimates, in general, indicate that chickpea had higher 
NEB values prior to 1989/90, while after this period wheat does. Though it is 
difficult to come to any definite conclusion from this trend, if wheat continues to 
have higher NEB values into the 1990's, then it can be stated that wheat is the most 
efficient crop to produce. Both wheat and chickpea have positive NEB values 
j indicating that Madhya Pradesh has comparative advantage in both wheat and 
chickpea production. 
4) In Rajasthan, all four estimates (especially with black-market exchange rate, 
Tables 13B and 13C) indicate that wheat has the highest NEB values. This is 
followed by mustard and chickpea. Further, all the four crops have positive NEB 
values indicating that Rajasthan has comparative advantage in the production of all 
three crops. However, wheat production results in the greatest efficiency. 
The above Net Economic Benefit results show that in all the four states 
studied, wheat is the most efficient crop to produce. Further, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya 
Pradesh and Rajasthan have comparative advantage in the production of wheat, 
chickpea and mustard, while Haryana had a comparative advantage only in wheat 
and chickpea production. Consequently, mustard production in Haryana results in 
the greatest efficiency losses. 
­
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Table 13 Net Economic Benefit (NEB) Using Procurement Prices and Official Exchange Rate (Rs/Ha) 
State Crop 1980-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 
Haryana Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
214 
427 
-991 
421 
1099 
-641 
351 
763 
-559 
775 
1226 
-21 
506 
2176 
906 
1692 
1987 
410 
1053 
815 
-235 
527 
-1092 
-1865 
1259 
1895 
-381 
2694 
5234 
659 
1209 
3759 
-60 
2541 
7454 
1253 
3554 
10622 
1339 
01 
tv 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
-314 
-240 
-613 
516 
514 
-381 
698 
513 
-453 
1274 
924 
29 
301 
1462 
742 
1510 
1304 
482 
789 
611 
-137 
-717 
-1400 
-350 
-15 
529 
781 
957 
2611 
1656 
-148 
1666 
1314 
1776 
3859 
2365 
2285 
5928 
2596 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
-465 
-579 
-6 
-114 
195 
-78 
343 
125 
-319 
434 
542 
367 
178 
-3 
-1231 
-1853 
-597 
-738 
98 
698 
-695 
210 
771 
1602 
1203 
2833 
Rajasthan Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
-101 
-324 
-147 
340 
419 
340 
362 
315 
323 
546 
512 
726 
-70 
1218 
1476 
858 
1232 
1083 
381 
625 
388 
-848 
-245 
-535 
-149 
1748 
565 
399 
4190 
1200 
-598 
3422 
839 
467 
5927 
1888 
698 
6682 
2430 
Source: See Appendix 4.10,4.11,4.12 and 4.13. 
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Table 13A Net Economic Benefit (NEB) Estimates Using Farm Harvest Prices and Official Exchange Rate (Rs/Ha). 
State Crop 1980-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 
Haryana Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
266 
416 
-1033 
437 
1081 
-673 
361 
748 
-592 
800 
1211 
-25 
569 
2164 
903 
1708 
1976 
366 
1059 
796 
-368 
564 
-1129 
-1983 
1274 
1874 
-455 
2697 
5224 
559 
1179 
3733 
-179 
2473 
7423 
1177 
01 
CJ.J 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
-266 
-237 
-659 
525 
521 
-387 
694 
529 
-469 
1295 
920 
-9 
353 
1460 
732 
1541 
1309 
476 
774 
612 
-186 
-710 
-1382 
-428 
-19 
550 
759 
934 
2604 
1624 
-200 
1691 
1247 
1668 
3890 
2324 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
-511 
-558 
-6 
-101 
201 
-51 
329 
138 
-364 
443 
526 
386 
185 
15 
-1234 
-1826 
-603 
-695 
119 
718 
-639 
237 
868 
1640 
Rajasthan Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
-158 
-301 
-211 
320 
452 
304 
353 
336 
325 
529 
532 
684 
-119 
1242 
1489 
847 
1267 
1071 
382 
653 
304 
-865 
-190 
-621 
-158 
1805 
537 
411 
4213 
1169 
-561 
3483 
768 
539 
5994 
1839 
Source: See Appendix A8. 
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Table 13B Net Economic Benefit (NEB) Using Procurement Prices and Black-market Exchange Rate (Rs/Ha). 
State Crop 1980-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 
Haryana Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
330 
795 
-845 
577 
1613 
-426 
697 
1886 
-28 
1079 
2067 
437 
827 
3498 
1731 
2115 
2936 
924 
1226 
1220 
-15 
860 
-289 
-1498 
1794 
3448 
356 
3148 
6538 
1217 
1402 
4510 
252 
2816 
8449 
1649 
4354 
13475 
2271 
01 
Iol:>­
Uttar 
Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
-168 
-4 
-500 
771 
868 
-219 
1335 
1308 
-93 
1803 
1526 
362 
759 
2368 
1351 
2041 
1933 
880 
1012 
877 
22 
-311 
-867 
-93 
605 
1540 
1313 
1414 
3426 
2072 
72 
2134 
1562 
2116 
4470 
2675 
3162 
7693 
3362 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
-342 
-450 
193 
85 
713 
384 
719 
470 
15 
950 
934 
729 
359 
155 
-900 
-1537 
-74 
-143 
483 
1201 
-497 
505 
1067 
1987 
1976 
3934 
Rajasthan Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
47 
-98 
1 
565 
761 
571 
896 
1066 
865 
940 
1052 
1165 
297 
2071 
2228 
1287 
1849 
1559 
572 
895 
583 
-522 
271 
-232 
379 
2743 
1140 
770 
5032 
1610 
-427 
3919 
1082 
705 
6580 
2193 
1301 
8349 
3238 
Source: See Appendix A8. 
I 
Table 13C Net Economic Benefit (NEB) Estimates Using Farm Harvest Prices and Black-market 
Exchange Rate (Rs/Ha). 
State Crop 1980-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 
Haryana Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
382 
784 
-887 
593 
1595 
-458 
707 
1870 
-61 
1104 
2052 
434 
890 
3486 
1728 
2131 
2925 
880 
1232 
1201 
-148 
897 
-326 
-1615 
1809 
3427 
282 
3151 
6528 
1117 
1372 
4484 
134 
2748 
8418 
1573 
01 
01 Uttar 
Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
-120 
-8 
-546 
780 
865 
-225 
1332 
1281 
-109 
1824 
1494 
324 
811 
2337 
1341 
2073 
1901 
874 
997 
830 
-28 
-304 
-901 
-171 
601 
1502 
1291 
1391 
3339 
2040 
19 
2080 
1496 
2009 
4418 
2634 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Chickpea 
Wheat 
-388 
-429 
192 
98 
719 
411 
706 
484 
-30 
959 
919 
749 
366 
172 
-904 
-1510 
-81 
-100 
505 
1221 
-442 
532 
1163 
2024 
Rajasthan Chickpea 
Wheat 
Mustard 
-10 
-76 
-64 
545 
793 
536 
887 
1087 
868 
923 
1072 
1122 
248 
2095 
2241 
1275 
1884 
1547 
572 
923 
500 
-539 
325 
-318 
370 
2801 
1112 
782 
5055 
1579 
-390 
3980 
1011 
776 
6646 
2144 
Source: See Appendix A8. 
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Summary of Results 
Summarizing the results of the previous analysis will shed some light on the 
effect of government policy on chickpea competitiveness. A survey of the NPC, EPC 
and ESC values showed that even though the output price policy had regional biases 
(as indicated by the NPCs) towards particular crops, some of these biases were more 
pronounced when input subsidies were taken into consideration, e.g. mustard. On 
the other hand, wheat, which was disprotected in the NPC analysis, had neutral to 
positive protection in its ESC estimates. These movements are indicative of the 
heavy subsidy given to non-traded inputs in Indian agriculture. 
Considering effective incentives (ESC values), mustard received the highest 
level of protection in all the states examined. This high positive protection is due to 
both a favorable price policy which gave mustard farmers higher than world prices, 
and input subsidies. However, this high positive protection also indicates that 
mustard attracted more resources than it would have under free trade. Resources 
such as land, labor etc. were diverted into mustard production (see Figures 5.6.7 and 
8) and away from chickpea and wheat production due to the higher incentives given 
to mustard producers. 
The levels of protection between chickpea and wheat vary regionally. In the 
northern wheat growing regions of Haryana, wheat received neutral protection, 
while chickpea was disprotected. This indicates a bias in the policy against chickpea 
producers. In Uttar Pradesh chickpea received slightly higher protection than wheat, 
though the difference was not large. However, in the states of Madhya Pradesh and 
Rajasthan, chickpea was positively protected and had higher levels of protection 
than wheat. Wheat received positive protection in Madhya Pradesh and neutral 
protection in the Rajasthan. Thus in these major chickpea producing states, 
chickpea received strong incentives for its production and even greater incentives 
than wheat. This clearly indicates that the price policy favored chickpea producers in 
these states. However, across all states mustard received the greatest protection and 
production incentives. 
On estimating the Net Economic Benefit, it became clear that across all the 
states, wheat is the most efficient crop to produce. All the states had comparative 
advantage in the production of chickpea, wheat and mustard, except for Haryana 
which has a comparative disadvantage in mustard production. Therefore the high 
effective incentives given to mustard, especially in Haryana, are misplaced and lead 
to inefficient resource use. Consequently, the country would be better off in 
reducing/ stopping mustard production and relying on imports for its domestic 
requirements. A similar argument holds for chickpea production, especially in 
•Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan where it enjoys high levels of positive protection. 
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6. Summary And Conclusions 
This chapter will integrate the findings of the previous chapters and based on 
this, venture some policy suggestions. 
Summary of Results 
In Section 2, the national growth rates of various crops revealed that while 
total foodgrain production was showing strong positive rates of growth, pulses in 
general and chickpea in particular were performing dismally. Further, the negative 
growth in chickpea acreage and production was responsible for the stagnation of 
national pulse acreage and production. Chickpea had a high positive growth rate in 
area and production prior to the Green Revolution, which turned negative in the 
post-Green Revolution period The declines in chickpea acreage which occurred in 
the Indo-Gangetic region, especially in the wheat growing states of Punjab, Haryana 
and western Uttar Pradesh as a consequence of the spread of HYV wheat were 
mainly responsible for this negative growth in national chickpea acreage. However, 
chickpea acreage did increase in the central states, though these increases were 
inadequate to compensate for the acreage lost in the north. In addition, the low 
productivity of the central regions further reduced the compensatory effect of their 
increasing chickpea acreage. Finally, it was also seen that the cultivation of chickpea 
and other pulses was being progressively shunned by large operational holdings, the 
main market producers. This was especially true of irrigated holdings. Thus, behind 
the stagnation of pulse production in India is the marginalization of chickpea in the 
most productive regions and operational holdings. 
Section 3 focused on analyzing the specific factors behind chickpea's decline. 
The area of study was narrowed to Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya 
Pradesh. The first two (representative of the northern wheat growing zones) have 
experienced steep declines in chickpea acreage in the post-Green Revolution period, 
while the latter two have experienced increasing acreage (Rajasthan has only 
recently experienced decreasing chickpea area). In analyzing the factors affecting 
chickpea competitiveness, there emerged two different patterns in chickpea 
agriculture - one of the Indo-Gangetic states of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, the other 
of the central states of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. 
In Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, it was seen that the introduction of modern 
wheat varieties and the high input technique of cultivation associated with it are 
perhaps the most significant factors behind chickpea's decline. The cultivation of 
modern wheat varieties was not compatible with the traditional mixed or sequential 
•
cropping of chickpea. The higher wheat yields translated into higher profits 
compared to competing crops, and with the growth in infrastructure such as 
irrigation to exploit wheat's yield potential, increasing amounts of land were sown 
to HYV wheat. Added to this, the higher risk associated with. chickpea cultivation in 
Haryana and Uttar Pradesh further hindered its competitiveness. Besides this, 
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chickpea was not competitive with irrigated mustard. In dryland agriculture, 
chickpea's situation did not change as it continued to have lower revenues and 
greater yield risk in comparison to wheat and mustard. 
In the main chickpea producing states of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, the 
trends in chickpea production were different from those of the north. This region, 
characterized by poor irrigation and other infrastructure, restricted the rapid 
adoption of HYV wheat. With wheat not having its yield advantage, chickpea 
remained profitable compared to irrigated wheat in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. 
In addition, its lower yield risk in Madhya Pradesh clearly put it at an advantage. 
However, given the profitability and revenue levels of mustard in other states14, it 
would seem that irrigated mustard is more competitive than irrigated chickpea in 
Madhya Pradesh. In Rajasthan too, irrigated mustard had higher returns per hectare 
making it more competitive. Under dryland conditions in Madhya Pradesh and 
Rajasthan, chickpea with higher returns than wheat and lower yield risk is certainly 
more competitive. However, as in Rajasthan, where unirrigated mustard has higher 
returns, it is possible that in Madhya Pradesh too, dryland mustard is more 
profitable. Therefore it was concluded that chickpea is not competitive in any of 
these states under both irrigated and unirrigated conditions. 
Sections 4 and 5 focused on the role of the government's agricultural price 
policy on chickpea competitiveness. It was seen that the input and output markets 
for chickpea, wheat and mustard were manipulated by government policy. 
Particularly important were the output prices and irrigation subsidy offered to 
producers. In Section 5 the effect of this policy on the incentive structure for 
chickpea, wheat and mustard production was quantified by estimating the various 
coefficients of protection. Considering effective incentives (ESC estimates), it was 
seen that across all states, mustard producers received the highest protection relative 
to wheat and chickpea, and consequently the greatest production incentives. Clearly, 
the increasing mustard acreage in these states is testimony to this. The levels of 
protection between chickpea and wheat vary regionally. In the northern wheat 
growing regions of Haryana, wheat received greater protection than chickpea. This 
indicates a policy bias against chickpea in this region. In Uttar Pradesh chickpea 
received slightly higher protection than wheat, though the relative difference was 
not large. In Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, chickpea had higher levels of 
protection than wheat. Thus in these states, government intervention provided 
chickpea farmers with strong production incentives. A comparison of the acreage 
trends and profitability of these crops will show that they are generally in line with 
their incentive structure. Therefore, from an analysis of the coefficients of 
protection it is clear that certain crops received strong regional incentives for their 
production, which are generally in line with their profitability and acreage trends. 
-

14 Mustard data for Madhya Pradesh not available. Rajasthan would serve as a reasonable indication 
of mustard's profitability and gross revenue levels in Madhya Pradesh. However, it should be noted 
that all the crops are affected similarly. The NEB calculations are described in Appendix A8. 
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On estimating the Net Economic Benefit, it became clear that across all the 
states, wheat is the most efficient crop to produce. In addition, all states had 
comparative advantage in the production of chickpea, wheat and mustard, except 
for Haryana, which has a comparative disadvantage in mustard production. 
Therefore the high effective incentives given to mustard in Haryana are misplaced 
and lead to inefficient resource use. 
Poli'}' Implications 
From the above discussion, it becomes clear that many factors affected 
chickpea's competitiveness in Indian agriculture. Factors such as low yields, high 
yield variability and incompatibility with HYV agriculture are technological 
constraints. As long as chickpea's low yields inhibit its profitability, it will not be 
competitive with wheat in irrigated agriculture. This is clearly the case in Haryana 
and Uttar Pradesh. Further, with the spread of proper irrigation in the lesser 
productive regions of the country (e.g. Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan) and the 
consequent increases in HYV wheat acreage further declines in chickpea acreage and 
production can be expected over the long term. 
With no significant technological breakthroughs in chickpea, the only other 
alternative in making it competitive would be to tinker with the price policy and 
make it more profitable than its competing crops. Conversely, the government can 
also make chickpea's competing crops less attractive to farmers by lowering the 
input subsidies for wheat and mustard production. This would include charging the 
full cost of inputs such as irrigation, electricity, fertilizer, etc. If output prices are not 
freed, such a policy will have little impact on chickpea's competitiveness in Haryana 
and Uttar Pradesh, given that it is not competitive with unirrigated wheat and 
mustard in these states. In the central regions of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, 
where neither wheat nor mustard have a yield advantage over chickpea, such a 
policy would enhance chickpea's competitiveness and consequently increasing 
acreage can be expected. 
Even though reducing or eliminating input subsidies is a step towards 
efficient pricing and would bring about significant fiscal savings for the 
government, it is not the best solution if pursued without output price 
liberalization and would be perceived to be unfair. This is because farmers would be 
required to pay the full cost of inputs while receiving less than world prices for their 
output (except mustard) with resulting adverse changes in incentives. Besides this, 
the government would still be shouldering the burden of subsidizing output prices 
(e.g. mustard). The obvious and most efficient solution would be to remove barriers 
•so that farmers would face world prices. In effect this would be a free trade scenario 
with no input subsidies. 
The NEB coefficients indicated that under such free trade conditions, wheat is 
the most efficient and profitable crop to produce. Diverting resources used in the 
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production of chickpea and mustard into wheat production would result in the 
most efficient allocation of resources. However, such a step directly conflicts with 
any policy aimed at increasing chickpea acreage. Further, given that wheat has the 
greatest economic profitability among its competing crops, declines in chickpea (and 
mustard) acreage can be expected. 
Though declines in chickpea acreage would conflict with the national goals of 
food self-sufficiency and the use of chickpea to diversify the cropping pattern, there 
are significant benefits to be realized from such a free trade situation. First, the 
removal of input subsidies, which the Indian government is currently considering, 
would not only reduce the fiscal burden on the government, but would also force 
farmers to be more judicious in their use of these inputs. The scarce government 
funds, which are being spent on supporting inefficient resource use can be usefully 
used elsewhere. Secondly, the environmental damage done by excessive fertilizer 
and irrigation use would be controlled if such a input pricing policy takes effect. 
Finally, the freeing of output prices would in the case of mustard and chickpea (in 
central India), would relieve the government of having to subsidize the output 
prices of these crops. Therefore, overall significant and direct savings to the 
government will result, besides the added benefits of conserving scarce resources 
and the environment. 
One of the common arguments against establishing such a free trade scenario 
is that self-sufficiency in food production is sacrificed. If the aim of achieving self­
sufficiency in chickpea and mustard production is to save foreign exchange by 
reducing imports, a policy of raising the level of protection on these crops (as was 
done for mustard) would be counter productive. Foreign exchange can be saved 
with greater efficiency if resources were allocated to wheat and the surplus wheat 
exported to earn foreign exchange. The export earnings can be then be used to 
purchase chickpea from the world market, a policy that would lead to a net savings 
in foreign exchange without compromising on economic efficiency. However, if the 
idea behind self-sufficiency is food security or similar concerns, then the resulting 
economic efficiency of positively protecting chickpea and mustard would have to be 
taken as a cost of this self-sufficiency. 
•
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Appendix Al : Import Prices for Selected Commodities and World 
Inflation Index 
Chickpea Chickpea Chickpea Wheat Mustard MUV Index Year Import Import Value Unit value ($/ton) ($/ton) (1981/82=100)(tons) ('000 Rs) (Rs/ton) 
1980-81 6139.00 16183.00 2636.10 164.00 305.00 99.53
 
1981-82 1244.00 3876.00 3115.76 177.00 320.00 100.00
 
1982-83 1194.00 3892.00 3259.63 161.00 285.00 98.42
 
1983-84 2873.00 10155.00 3534.63 158.00 299.00 97.76
 
1984-85 2303.00 5442.00 2363.00 153.00 342.00 97.87
 
1985-86 5337.00 21694.00 4064.83 138.00 287.00 100.84
 
1986-87 8340.00 32569.00 3905.16 115.00 246.00 117.77
 
1987-88 7531.00 27899.00 3704.55 114.00 172.00 109.87
 
1988-89 7587.00 36222.00 4774.22 146.00 240.00 107.32
 
1989-90 941.00 5092.70 5412.01 171.00 229.00 99.28
 
1990-91 44989.00 190165.00 4226.92 137.00 204.00 105.66
 
1991-92 4812.00 30124.00 6260.18 129.00 199.00 102.17
 
1992-93 35993.00 247369.00 6872.70 151.00 210.00 104.24
 
-

Source: UNFAO, Production Yearbook. Various issues, (Rome: Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations). 
Government of India, Bulletin on Food Statistics. Various issues, (New Delhi: Ministry of 
Agriculture). 
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Appendix A2 Deflated Import Prices and Exchange Rates 
Year 
Chickpea 
Unit value 
(Rs/ton) 
Wheat 
($/ton) 
Mustard 
($/ton) 
Official 
Exchange 
Rates ($/Rs) 
Blackmarket 
Exchange 
Rate ($/Rs) 
1980-81 2648.63 164.78 306.45 0.13 0.12 
1981-82 3115.76 177.00 320.00 0.11 0.10 
1982-83 3311.87 163.58 289.57 0.11 0.08 
1983-84 3615.76 161.63 305.86 0.10 0.08 
1984-85 2414.46 156.33 349.45 0.09 0.07 
1985-86 4031.07 136.85 284.62 0.08 0.07 
1986-87 3315.80 97.64 208.87 0.08 0.07 
1987-88 3371.67 103.76 156.54 0.08 0.07 
1988-89 4448.70 136.05 223.64 0.07 0.06 
1989-90 5451.13 172.24 230.66 0.06 0.05 
1990-91 4000.39 129.66 193.07 0.06 0.05 
1991-92 6127.43 126.26 194.78 0.04 0.04 
1992-93 6593.08 144.86 201.46 0.04 0.03 
Source: UNFAO, Production Yearbook. Various issues, (Rome: Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations). 
Government of India, Bulletin on Food Statistics. Various issues, (New Delhi: 
Ministry of Agriculture). 
Cowitt, Phillip P. , ed. World Currency Yearbook. Brooklyn, New York: Currency 
Data & Intelligence, Inc.,Various issues. 
-
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Appendix A3: Procurement Prices and General CPI Index for Agricultural Laborers 
Chickpea Wheat Mustard Rural CPI Deflated Deflated Deflated 
Year (Rs/ton) (Rs/ton) (Rs/ton) (1981/82=100) Chickpea Wheat Mustard (Rs/ton) (Rs/ton) (Rs/ton) 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
0\ 1984-85 
W 1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1650.00 
2270.00 
2350.00 
2400.00 
2450.00 
2600.00 
2800.00 
2900.00 
3250.00 
4210.00 
4500.00 
5000.00 
6000.00 
1300.00 
1420.00 
1510.00 
1520.00 
1570.00 
1620.00 
1660.00 
1730.00 
1830.00 
2150.00 
2250.00 
2750.00 
3000.00 
2600.00 
3300.00 
3550.00 
3600.00 
3850.00 
4000.00 
4150.00 
4300.00 
4600.00 
5750.00 
6000.00 
6700.00 
7600.00 
91.30 
100.00 
107.40 
116.50 
117.20 
123.90 
129.00 
145.10 
161.60 
167.90 
185.30 
224.80 
239.50 
1807.25 
2270.00 
2188.08 
2060.09 
2090.44 
2098.47 
2170.54 
1998.62 
2011.14 
2507.44 
2428.49 
2224.20 
2505.22 
1423.90 
1420.00 
1405.96 
1304.72 
1339.59 
1307.51 
1286.82 
1192.28 
1132.43 
1280.52 
1214.25 
1223.31 
1252.61 
2847.79 
3300.00 
3305.40 
3090.13 
3284.98 
3228.41 
3217.05 
2963.47 
2846.53 
3424.66 
3237.99 
2980.43 
3173.28 
Source: Government of India, Bulletin on Food Statistics. Various issues, (New Delhi: Ministry of Agriculture). 
Note: (a) The procurement prices for 1980/81, 1981/82 and 1983/84 are the recommended prices of the 
Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices, but not fixed by the government. 
I 
Appendix A4.1 : Chickpea - Fann Harvest Prices (Rs/ton). 
Year Haryana 
Uttar 
P d h
ra es 
Madhya.
P d h Rajasthan
ra es 
Rural CPI 
(1981/82-100)
-
Deflated 
H aryana 
Deflated 
UttarP d h
ra es 
Deflated 
MadhyaP d h
ra es 
Deflated 
R' thaJas an 
1980-81 3400.00 2941.20 3098.80 3166.00 91.30 3724.04 3221.51 3394.13 3467.74 
1981-82 2880.00 2470.90 2281.70 2781.90 100.00 2880.00 2470.90 2281.70 2781.90 
1982-83 2770.00 2269.80 2167.50 2607.90 107.40 2579.14 2113.41 2018.16 2428.21 
1983-84 3430.00 2879.80 2844.30 2937.70 116.50 2944.21 2471.93 2441.46 2521.63 
1984-85 4650.00 3723.40 3959.70 3971.70 117.20 3967.58 3176.96 3378.58 3388.82 
1985-86 3750.00 4051.30 3785.00 3614.30 123.90 3026.63 3269.81 3054.88 2917.11 
0'\ 1986-87 3842.90 3171.20 3346.30 3584.90 129.00 2978.99 2458.29 2594.03 2778.99 
~ 
1987-88 5703.00 4455.00 4350.10 4889.80 145.10 3930.39 3070.30 2998.00 3369.95 
1988-89 5944.40 5131.40 5538.90 5654.30 161.60 3678.47 3175.37 3427.54 3498.95 
1989-90 7194.80 6203.50 6117.30 6515.50 167.90 4285.17 3694.76 3643.42 3880.58 
1990-91 6924.30 6149.60 5770.20 6321.40 185.30 3736.81 3318.73 3113.98 3411.44 
1991-92 7232.6 6128.5 5959 6341.5 224.80 3217.35 2726.20 2650.80 2820.95 
Source: Government of India, Bulletin on Food Statistics. Various issues, (New Delhi, Ministry of Agriculture). 
I 
Appendix A4.2 : Wheat - Farm Harvest Prices (Rs/ton). 
Year Haryana 
Uttar 
P d hra es 
Madhya.
P d h Rajasthanra es 
Rural CPI 
(1981/82-100)
-
Deflated 
Haryana 
Deflated 
UttarP d hra es 
Deflated 
MadhyaP d hra es 
Deflated 
R' thaJas an 
1980-81 1380.00 1329.60 1711.20 1557.20 91.30 1511.52 1456.32 1874.29 1705.61 
1981-82 1550.00 1493.40 1660.10 1772.50 100.00 1550.00 1493.40 1660.10 1772.50 
1982-83 1630.00 1678.10 2013.60 1755.10 107.40 1517.69 1562.48 1874.86 1634.17 
1983-84 1640.00 1479.30 1781.60 1772.60 116.50 1407.73 1269.79 1529.27 1521.55 
1984-85 1660.00 1539.40 1732.50 1854.00 117.20 1416.38 1313.48 1478.24 1581.91 
1985-86 1700.00 1668.30 2004.90 2023.90 123.90 1372.07 1346.49 1618.16 1633.49 
1986-87 1807.30 1672.50 2002.30 1981.30 129.00 1401.01 1296.51 1552.17 1535.89 
0\ 
U1 1987-88 2038.00 1951.70 2297.00 2434.90 145.10 1404.55 1345.07 1583.05 1678.08 
1988-89 2016.60 2116.30 2821.80 2630.00 161.60 1247.90 1309.59 1746.16 1627.48 
1989-90 2240.30 2057.20 2597.80 2466.00 167.90 1334.31 1225.25 1547.23 1468.73 
1990-91 2492.80 2620.20 2893.80 3116.20 185.30 1345.28 1414.03 1561.68 1681.71 
1991-92 3087.50 3289.30 3804.30 3851.30 224.80 1373.44 1463.21 1692.30 1713.21 
Source: Government of India, Bulletin on Food Statistics. Various issues, (New Delhi, Ministry of Agriculture). 
I 
Appendix A4.3: Mustard - Farm Harvest Prices (Rs/ton). 
Uttar Madhya. Rural CPI Uttar Madhya .Year Haryana Pradesh Pradesh Rajasthan (1981/82=100) Haryana Pradesh Pradesh Rajasthan 
1980-81 3680.00 4112.40 4170.80 4228.20 91.30 4030.72 4504.33 4568.30 4631.17 
1981-82 4120.00 3510.70 3769.10 4139.80 100.00 4120.00 3510.70 3769.10 4139.80 
1982-83 4370.00 4118.60 4039.00 3482.80 107.40 4068.90 3834.82 3760.71 3242.83 
1983-84 3690.00 4863.60 4964.80 4675.50 116.50 3167.38 4174.76 4261.63 4013.30 
1984-85 3920.00 4163.80 4147.30 3532.20 117.20 3344.71 3552.73 3538.65 3013.82 
1985-86 5080.00 4188.30 3988.30 4312.10 123.90 4100.08 3380.39 3218.97 3480.31 
1986-87 7481.10 5873.90 6061.00 6509.80 129.00 5799.30 4553.41 4698.45 5046.36 
1987-88 7125.40 6957.40 7202.90 6808.40 145.10 4910.68 4794.90 4964.09 4692.21 
0\ 
0\ 1988-89 6433.90 5359.80 5601.70 5496.00 161.60 3981.37 3316.71 3466.40 3400.99 
1989-90 8101.20 6746.20 6580.20 6751.20 167.90 4825.01 4017.99 3919.12 4020.96 
1990-91 9270.50 8308.00 9001.80 8511.70 185.30 5002.97 4483.54 4857.96 4593.47 
1991-92 9297.70 8482.20 8726.80 8862.40 224.80 4135.99 3773.22 3882.03 3942.35 
Source: Government of India, Bulletin on Food Statistics. Various issues, (New Delhi, Ministry of Agriculture). 
I 
APPENDIX AS 
SUBSIDY TO PRIMARY INPUTS 
To measure the irrigation, electricity and credit subsidy received by a 
farmer, the economic price of irrigated water net of water charges needs to be 
estimated. Various methods for estimating the economic price of irrigation water 
have been suggested. Among them are: 
(1) To take the water rates charged by private water suppliers as representative of 
the economic price of water. The difference between this price and that charged by 
government authorities will give the subsidy on water. However, there are 
several problems with this, among them (a) since private water suppliers usually 
operate in a localized area, they may not be operating in a competitive market and 
so the price charged by them could be the result of monopolistic or oligopolistic 
pricing. Thus it would tend to inflate the economic price, (b) private water 
suppliers being a local phenomenon, consistent time series data across states is 
difficult to obtain. 
(2) To find the annual!seasonal Operation and Maintenance costs (0 & M costs) of 
a major, medium or minor irrigation project, and thus estimate the cost of 
producing a unit of water. This methodology equates the economic price of water 
with its marginal cost of production, thus being a strict estimate of the cost of 
irrigated water. However, the major drawback of this approach is that it ignores 
capital cost from the calculation and so will undervalue the economic cost of 
water. 
(3) To estimate the annual!seasonal 0 & M costs of an irrigation project and add 
on to that the annualized cost of capital (opportunity cost of capital) adjusted for 
depreciation. A variation of this method is used in this analysis. Incidentally, this 
method of estimating the economic cost of water is recommended by the 
Planning Commission of India. l This analysis is confined to estimating the 
economic cost of water from minor irrigation works only. It is quite possible that 
the economic cost of water from major and medium irrigation projects will give 
different values of the economic cost of water. 
The economic cost of water will depend on the particular irrigation scheme 
under consideration as the capital costs, maintenance costs, overheads, .. etc. will 
be unique for individual schemes. In addition to this, the economic cost of water 
will vary between major, medium and minor irrigation schemes. Thus to get the 
economic cost of water for a state, one would have to average the cost among the 
various irrigation schemes to arrive at a representative figure. However, this 
study will attempt to evaluate the economic cost of water from deep tubewells of 
• 
minor irrigation schemes only. This would provide one estimate of the economic 
lSee Government of India, Report of the Committee on Pricing of Irrigation Water. September 1992, 
(New Delhi: Government of India) 
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1 
cost of water. 
Estimating the Economic cost of water for minor irrigation schemes. 
Minor irrigation schemes consist of dug-wells, tanks, shallow tube-wells, 
deep tube wells, lift irrigation schemes, ... etc. Here the economic cost of water 
from a deep tube well is estimated. This study has adapted the procedure for 
estimating the economic cost of water as described in Sangal (1991). 
The Operation & Maintenance charges for tubewell schemes, set as a 
percentage of the capital cost are described below. 0 & M charges translated as a 
percentage of capital cost is valid on an average basis, but such costs would vary by 
scheme. 
Table Al Operation and Maintenance Charges for Minor Irrigation Schemes ­
Tubewell Scheme. 
Item Percentage of Capital Cost (%) 
1. Establishment charges 
a. Regular 
b. Work charged 
2. Maintenance of works 
3. Depreciation 
4. Energy charges 
2.50 
2.00 
4.00 
2.50 
TOTAL 11.00 
Note: Cost escalation on items 1,2 is taken at 5 per cent per annum.
 
Source: Sangal, S.P. "Pricing of Irrigation Waters in India," Economic and Political Weekly, (November 16, 1991) :
 
2645.
 
Table A2 Parameters for Calculatin~ Economic Cost of Water for Deep Tubewell. 
Parameters 
1. Capital cost of tubewell (1980) 
Capital cost of tubewell (1989) 
2. Annual compound rate of growth 
of capital cost (1980 - 1989). 
3. Repayment period of capital 
4. Interest rate 
5. Horse Power of pump set 
6. Culturable Command Area (CCA) 
7. Discharge (CuM/Hr) 
8. Annual working hours 
Value 
Rs. 90,000.00 
Rs.400,OOO.00 
16.10 % 
15 years 
8.5 % 
30 HP or 22.371 kW 
40Ha. 
102 m 3 / Hr. 
1,500 Hrs. -

Adapted from: Sangal, S.P. "Pricing of Irrigation Waters in India," Economic and Political Weekly, (November 16, 
1991) : 2646. 
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The above parameters are based on an actual public sector deep tube well in 
the state of Gujarat. For the purposes of this study, it has been assumed that the 
parameters mentioned above hold for other states in India also. The interest rate 
of 8.5 per cent, is representative of the average yield of government bonds (Gulati 
and Sharma 1995, A-95). This represents the opportunity cost of capital, as funds 
for the tubewell scheme could be invested in these government bonds. The 
economic cost of electricity at the national level was taken from Economic 
Intelligence Service (1996, 15). The annual working hours of the tube well, which 
has been taken as 1,500 hours, is the average achieved by public sector wells. 
Generally, public tube wells operate between 1,500 to 2,000 hours a year, while 
private ones operate for 3,000 to 3,500 hours a year (Sangal 1991, 2648). 
Depreciation has not been included in the assessment. For a justification of this 
see Sanghal (1990). 
The details of the calculation of the economic cost of water are given on the 
following pages. Since capital cost data was available only for the years 1980 and 
1990, it has been assumed that capital cost grew at a constant compound rate of 
16.10 per cent per annum between these two periods. This growth rate has been 
assumed to continue into 1992/93. The calculation of the economic cost of water, 
as shown on the following pages is as follows : 
I. Part I, is the calculation of Operational & Maintenance cost. Establishment & 
Maintenance charges are calculated as a percentage of the total capital cost 
indicated in Table 1. The energy cost is calculated as the total energy cost of 
running the tubewell for one year (1,500 hrs.). 
II. The main idea behind the calculation in part II is to find the present value of 
total amount spent in setting up and running this tubewell for 15 years (the loan 
period). Since there is a 5 per cent annual increase in Establishment & 
Maintenance costs, Ib and Ie are suitably increased. This value is given in IIa. The 
present value (PV) of the total amount spent in Establishment & Maintenance (II 
b) over the 15 year period is calculated with the following formula, commonly 
used to estimate the present value of a 'growing annuity' : 
-
where,
 
PV =Present value of yearly installments over 15 years.
 
A = Annual installment
 
rl =rate of growth of yearly installment (in this case 5 %)
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r2 = rate of interest on loan (8.5 %)
 
t =number of years to repay loan (15 years)
 
The present value of energy costs (II c) over the 15 year period was calculated 
using the following formula for the present value of a 'annuity': 
PV =~[1- (_1Jt]
r2 l+r2 
PV =Present value of yearly installments over 15 years.
 
A = Annual installment
 
r2 = rate of interest on loan (8.5 %) 
t =number of years to repay loan (15 years) 
When the Present Value of the costs lIb and IIc are added to the capital costs 
(lie), it gives the Total Present Value (IIf) of setting up and operating the tubewell 
system. This is the total cost of setting up and operating the tubewell system over 
the 15 year loan period. Since this cost has to be spread over 15 years the yearly 
installment to accomplish this is given in the Equated Annual Installment (IlIa). 
Thus the value in lila represents the cost of running the tubewell system every 
year. This value divided by the volume of water discharged in a year will give the 
cost of a unit of water (IVa). 
From the economic cost of water, the economic cost of irrigating a hectare 
of wheat, chickpea and mustard in each state is calculated. Each of these crops 
have different water requirements in each state and this has been incorporated 
(see Appendix 5.2). From this cost, the price of irrigation water in each state has 
been subtracted to arrive at the total subsidy on the particular crop in each state. 
Therefore, by valuing electricity and credit at its economic cost, estimating the cost 
of water in this fashion incorporates the subsidy on electricity and credit on crop 
production. 
-
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APPENDIX AS.l 
Year 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 
a. Capital cost for Deep Tube Well (Rs) 90000 104478 121285 140795 163444 189737 220259 255691 296822 344571 400000 464346 539043 
b. Establishment charges - 2.5% Capital cost (Rs) 2250 2612 3032 3520 4086 4743 5506 6392 7421 8614 10000 11609 13476 
c. Maintenance charges -2% Capital cost (Rs) 1800 2090 2426 2816 3269 3795 4405 5114 5936 6891 8000 9287 10781 
d. Average Cost of Power Supply (paise/Kwh) 41.90 46.77 52.22 58.29 65.07 71.55 78.67 86.50 95.11 104.58 114.99 126.43 139.02 
e. Energy charges (Rs) 14060.17 15695.76 17521.61 19559.86 21835.22 24008.75 26398.64 29026.43 31915.80 35092.78 38586.01 42426.96 46650.25 
f. Total Operation + Maintenance Cost (Rs) 18110.17 20397.26 22979.42 25895.64 29190.20 32546.90 36310.28 40532.51 45272.80 50598.46 56586.01 63322.53 70907.19 
II 
a. First year Establishment+Maintenance cost 4253 4937 5731 6653 7723 8965 10407 12081 14025 16281 18900 21940 25470 
'! b. Present Value of Est.+Main. Cost (15 yrs) 47203 54797 63611 73844 85723 99513 115521 134105 155678 180721 209792 243541 282718 
I--' 
c. Present Value Energy Costs (15 yrs) 116759 130341 145504 162430 181325 199374 219221 241042 265036 291419 320427 352324 387395 
d. Present worth O+M charges (15yrs) 163962 185138 209115 236274 267048 298888 334742 375147 420714 472139 530220 595864 670113 
e. Capital Cost 90000 104478 121285 140795 163444 189737 220259 255691 296822 344571 400000 464346 539043 
f. Total Present Value 253962 289616 330400 377069 430492 488624 555001 630838 717536 816710 930220 1060210 1209156 
III 
a. Equated Annual Installment 30582 34876 39787 45407 51840 58840 66833 75966 86406 98349 112017 127671 145607 
IV 
a. Economic Water Rates Per Cu M (Rs) 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.37 0.42 0.48 
Source: Economic Intelligence Service, India's Energy Sector. (Mumbai: Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy Pvt. Ltd., September 1996),15. 
S.P. Sangal, "Pricing of Irrigation Waters in India," Economic and Political Weekly.( November 16,1991) : 2645 
I 
Appendix A5.2 Statewise Irrigation Subsidy 
Year 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 
Economic Water Rates Per Cu M (Rs) 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.37 0.42 0.48 
Haryana 
Wheat 
Irrigation depth (mts.) 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
Economic cost of irrigation (Rs/Ha) 509.70 581.26 663.11 756.78 864.00 980.67 1113.89 1266.10 1440.10 1639.14 1866.96 2127.85 2426.78 
Off. Water Rates for Canallrrigat. (Rs/Ha) 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 
Net Subsidy for Wheat (Rs/Ha) 447.92 519.48 601.33 695.00 802.22 918.89 1052.11 1204.32 1378.32 1577.36 1805.18 2066.07 2365.00 
~ Mustard 
Irrigation depth (mts.) 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Economic cost of irrigation (Rs/Ha) 439.74 501.48 572.10 652.91 745.41 846.07 961.00 1092.32 1242.44 1414.16 1610.71 1835.79 2093.70 
Off. Water Rates for Canallrrigat. (Rs/Ha) 66.72 66.72 66.72 66.72 66.72 66.72 66.72 66.72 66.72 66.72 66.72 66.72 66.72 
Net Subsidy for Mustard (Rs/Ha) 373.02 434.76 505.38 586.19 678.69 779.35 894.28 1025.60 1175.72 1347.44 1543.99 1769.07 2026.98 
Chickpea 
Irrigation depth (mts.) 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Economic cost of irrigation (Rs/Ha) 159.91 182.36 208.04 237.42 271.06 307.66 349.46 397.21 451.80 514.24 585.71 667.56 761.34 
Off. Water Rates for Canallrrigat. (Rs/Ha) 49.42 49.42 49.42 49.42 49.42 49.42 49.42 49.42 49.42 49.42 49.42 49.42 49.42 
Net Subsidy for Chickpea (Rs/Ha) 110.49 132.94 158.62 188.00 221.64 258.24 300.04 347.79 402.38 464.82 536.29 618.14 711.92 
I 
Appendix A5.2 
Year 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 
Uttar Pradesh 
Wheat 
Irrigation depth (mts.) 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Economic cost of irrigation (Rs/Ha) 519.70 592.66 676.12 771.62 880.94 999.90 1135.73 1290.92 1468.34 1671.28 1903.57 2169.57 2474.37 
Off. Water Rates for Flow Irrigat. (Rs/Ha) 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 
Net Subsidy for Wheat (Rs/Ha) 376.38 449.34 532.80 628.30 737.62 856.58 992.41 1147.60 1325.02 1527.96 1760.25 2026.25 2331.05 
Mustard 
Irrigation depth (mts.) 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Economic cost of irrigation (Rs/Ha) 169.90 193.75 221.04 252.26 288.00 326.89 371.30 422.03 480.03 546.38 622.32 709.28 808.93 
~ Off. Water Rates for Flow Irrigat. (Rs/Ha) 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 
Net Subsidy for Mustard (Rs/Ha) 26.58 50.43 77.72 108.94 144.68 183.57 227.98 278.71 336.71 403.06 479.00 565.% 665.61 
Chickpea 
Irrigation depth (mts.) 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 
Economic cost of irrigation (Rs/Ha) 419.76 478.69 546.09 623.23 711.53 807.61 917.32 1042.67 1185.97 1349.88 1537.49 1752.35 1998.53 
Off. Water Rates for Flow Irrigat. (Rs/Ha) 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 143.32 
Net Subsidy for Chickpea (Rs/Ha) 276.44 335.37 402.77 479.91 568.21 664.29 774.00 899.35 1042.65 1206.56 1394.17 1609.03 1855.21 
Appendix A5.2 
Year 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 
Madhya Pradesh 
Wheat 
Irrigation depth (mts.) 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 
Economic cost of irrigation (Rs/Ha) 629.63 718.03 819.14 934.85 1067.30 1211.42 1375.98 1564.00 1778.95 2024.82 2306.24 2628.52 2997.79 
Off. Water Rates from all sources (Rs/Ha) 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 61.78 
Net Subsidy for Wheat (Rs/Ha) 567.85 656.25 757.36 873.07 1005.52 1149.64 1314.20 1502.22 1717.17 1963.04 2244.46 2566.74 2936.01 
Mustard 
Irrigation depth (mts.) 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 
Economic cost of irrigation (Rs/Ha) 239.86 273.53 312.05 356.13 406.59 461.49 524.18 595.81 677.69 771.36 878.57 1001.34 1142.02 
~ Off. Water Rates from all sources (Rs/Ha) 44.88 44.88 44.88 44.88 44.88 44.88 44.88 44.88 44.88 44.88 44.88 44.88 44.88 
Net Subsidy for Mustard (Rs/Ha) 194.98 228.65 267.17 311.25 361.71 416.61 479.30 550.93 632.81 726.48 833.69 956.46 1097.14 
Chickpea 
Irrigation depth (mts.) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Economic cost of irrigation (Rs/Ha) 489.72 558.47 637.11 727.10 830.12 942.21 1070.21 1216.45 1383.63 1574.86 1793.74 2044.40 2331.62 
Off. Water Rates from aU sources (Rs/Ha) 42.01 42.01 42.01 42.01 42.01 42.01 42.01 42.01 42.01 42.01 42.01 42.01 42.01 
Net Subsidy for Chickpea (Rs/Ha) 447.71 516.46 595.10 685.09 788.11 900.20 1028.20 1174.44 1341.62 1532.85 1751.73 2002.39 2289.61 
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Appendix A5.2 
Year 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93
 
Rajasthan
 
Wheat 
Irrigation depth (mts.) 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 
Economic cost of irrigation (Rs/Ha) 629.63 718.03 819.14 934.BS 1067.30 1211.42 1375.98 1564.00 1778.95 2024.82 2306.24 2628.52 2997.79 
Off. Water Rates, all sources (Rs/Ha) 74.13 74.13 74.13 74.13 74.13 74.13 74.13 74.13 74.13 74.13 74.13 74.13 74.13 
Net Subsidy for Wheat (Rs/Ha) 555.50 643.90 745.01 860.72 993.17 1137.29 1301.BS 1489.87 1704.82 1950.69 2232.11 2554.39 2923.66 
Mustard 
Irrigation depth (mts.) 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 
Economic cost of irrigation (Rs/Ha) 239.86 273.53 312.05 356.13 406.59 461.49 524.18 595.81 677.69 771.36 878.57 1001.34 1142.02 ~ 
Off. Water Rates from all sources (Rs/Ha) 56.84 56.84 56.84 56.84 56.84 56.84 56.84 56.84 56.84 56.84 56.84 56.84 56.84 
Net Subsidy for Mustard (Rs/Ha) 183.02 216.69 255.21 299.29 349.75 404.65 467.34 538.97 620.BS 714.52 821.73 944.50 10BS.18 
Chickpea 
Irrigation depth (mts.) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Economic cost of irrigation (Rs/Ha) 489.72 558.47 637.11 727.10 830.12 942.21 1070.21 1216.45 1383.63 1574.86 1793.74 2044.40 2331.62 
Off. Water Rates from all sources (Rs/Ha) 71.66 71.66 71.66 71.66 71.66 71.66 71.66 71.66 71.66 71.66 71.66 71.66 71.66 
Net Subsidy for Chickpea (Rs/Ha) 418.06 486.81 565.45 655.44 758.46 870.55 998.55 1144.79 1311.97 1503.20 1722.08 1972.74 2259.96 
Source: Appendix AS.1
 
Planning Commission, Report on the Committee on Pricing of Irrigation Water, (New Delhi: Government of India, September 1992)
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AppendixA6 Nominal Protection Coefficients (NPC) of Fertilizers 
Fertilizer 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 
Urea - N (46% Nitrogen) 
Import (f.o.b. Mid East, US$/ton) - - - . - 108.00 130.00 135.00 125.00 180.00 146.00 
Freight, Mid East-Born (US$/ton) - - - - 23.50 23.50 23.50 23.50 23.50 15.63 
Exchange Rate ($/Rs) 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 
C&F Price ($/ton) - - - - - - 131.50 153.50 158.50 148.50 203.50 161.63 
Border Price (Rs/ton) 1896.00 2085.00 1380.00 1400.00 2000.00 2160.00 1340.00 1707.79 2224.64 2641.67 2651.79 4963.41 4040.75 
Handling expenses (Rs/ton) 750.00 900.00 900.00 900.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 
Dealers margin (Rs/ton) 105.00 120.00 120.00 130.00 115.00 130.00 130.00 130.00 130.00 130.00 130.00 130.00 130.00 
Border price at Farmgate (Rs/ton) 2751.00 3105.00 2400.00 2430.00 3115.00 3290.00 2470.00 2837.79 3354.64 3771.67 3781.79 6093.41 5170.75 
'-1 Domestic price (Rs/ton) 2000.00 2350.00 2350.00 2150.00 2150.00 2150.00 2350.00 2350.00 2350.00 2350.00 2350.00 3300.00 2760.00 
0\ NPC 0.73 0.76 0.98 0.88 0.69 0.65 0.95 0.83 0.70 0.62 0.62 0.54 0.53 
Oi-Ammonium Phosphate (OAP) 
Import (f.o.b. US Gulf, US$/ton) - - - - - - - 185.00 200.00 202.00 178.00 186.00 165.00 
Freight, US Gulf-Born (US$/ton) - - - - - - 48.50 48.50 48.50 48.50 48.50 36.00 
C&F Price ($/ton) 
- - - - - - 233.50 248.50 250.50 226.50 234.50 201.00 
Border price at Farmgate (Rs/ton) 2185.00 2206.00 2210.00 2050.00 2550.00 2490.00 2500.00 3032.47 3601.45 4175.00 4044.64 5719.51 5025.00 
Domestic price (Rs/ton) 750.00 900.00 900.00 900.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 
Dealers margin (Rs/ton) 125.00 145.00 145.00 190.00 190.00 190.00 190.00 190.00 190.00 190.00 190.00 190.00 190.00 
Border Price at Farmgate (Rs/ton) 3060.00 3251.00 3255.00 3140.00 3740.00 3680.00 3690.00 4222.47 4791.45 5365.00 5234.64 6909.51 6215.00 
Domestic price (Rs/ton) 3050.00 3600.00 3600.00 3350.00 3350.00 3350.00 3600.00 3600.00 3600.00 3600.00 3600.00 5040.00 6800.00 
NPC 1.00 1.11 1.11 1.07 0.90 0.91 0.98 0.85 0.75 0.67 0.69 0.73 1.09 
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Appendix A6 
Fertilizer 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93
 
Muriate of Potash (MOP)-60"IoK20
 
Import (f.o.b. Canada, US$/ton) - - - - - - - 69.00 87.00 100.00 100.00 112.00 115.00
 
Freight, Vancouver-Born (US$/ton) - - - - - . 30.35 30.35 30.35 30.35 30.35 35.00
 
C&F Price ($/ton) - - - - - 99.35 117.35 130.35 130.35 142.35 150.00
 
Border Price (Rs/ton) 1192.00 1246.00 935.00 1000.00 1200.00 1350.00 1190.00 1290.26 1700.72 2172.50 2327.68 3471.95 3750.00
 
Handling expenses (Rs/ton) 750.00 900.00 900.00 900.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00
 
Dealers margin (Rs/ton) BO.OO 90.00 90.00 95.00 95.00 95.00 95.00 95.00 95.00 95.00 95.00 95.00 95.00
 
Border price at Farmgate (Rs/ton) 2022.00 2236.00 1925.00 1995.00 2295.00 2445.00 2285.00 2385.26 2795.72 3267.50 3422.68 4566.95 4845.00
 
Domestic price (Rs/ton) 1100.00 1300.00 1300.00 1200.00 1200.00 1200.00 1300.00 1300.00 1300.00 1300.00 1300.00 1820.00 4500.00
 
NPC 0.54 0.58 0.68 0.60 0.52 0.49 0.57 0.55 0.46 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.93
 
'1 
'1 
Wt. Avg NPC of NPK Fertilizer 0.77 0.81 0.97 0.89 0.72 0.69 0.91 0.80 0.69 0.61 0.61 0.57 0.70 
NPK domestic prices (Rs/ton) 2132.00 2509.50 2509.50 2309.50 2309.50 2309.50 2509.50 2509.50 2509.50 2509.50 2509.50 3520.00 3840.20 
NPK border prices (Rs/ton) 2738.79 3041.53 2535.85 2538.35 3162.30 3282.85 2718.05 3092.64 3609.26 4066.74 4061.91 6105.05 5364.65 
NPC 0.78 0.83 0.99 0.91 0.73 0.70 0.92 0.81 0.70 0.62 0.62 0.58 0.72 
Note: (a) Ocean freight for 1990/91 has been used for the years 1987/88 to 1989/90.
 
b) Handling expenses for 1986/87 have been used for 1987/88 to 1991/92.
 
c) In NPK the weights for N,P,K have been taken in the ratio of 0.67:0.22:0.11. This is the ratio of their consumption levels averaged
 
over 1980/81 to 1985/86.
 
d) The border£rices for 1980/81 to 1986/87 were taken from Gulati, Hanson and Pursell, Effectiye Incentives in India's Agriculture­

Cotton Groun nuts. Wheat. and Rice. New Delhi: The World Bank, Country Economics Department, January 1990),53
 
Source: Ashok Gulati, James Hanson and Gary Pursell, Effective Incentiyes in India's Agriculture - Cotton Groundnuts. Wheat. and
 
~ (New Delhi: The World Bank, Country Economics Department, January 1990),53.
 
Fertiliser Association of India, Fertiliser Statistics. various issues, (New Delhi: Fertiliser Association of India).
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APPENDIXA7
 
METIfODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING BORDER PRICES
 
If the crop is imported, the relevant price is its c.iJ. price. This price 
needs to be adjusted for port handling, internal transportation and 
processing margins to the point at which the import competes with 
domestic production. There are two extreme points of competition, the 
port and the farmgate. In this analysis, the point of competition for surplus 
producing states (e.g. Punjab for wheat) has been taken to be the port. The 
adjustments made for surplus states are shown below. 
Processing and
 
Adjusted border Observed Handling costs Trans~ort and marketing costs
 
+ b d - marketmg costs price at er from farmgate border price or from market to 
to marketborder 
The transportation and marketing costs from the farmgate to the port have 
been deducted as the price the farmer will receive at the port will be less by 
the amount of these costs. In the actual computation of the border price, 
the processing and marketing margins from the farmgate to the market 
were assumed to be negligible. 
For a state deficit in production (i.e. Madhya Pradesh for wheat), the 
point of competition is taken at the farmgate. To arrive at the border price 
at the farm-gate the following adjustment needs to be made in the border 
price to make it comparable at the farm-gate level. 
transport marketing transport processing &Adjusted observed handling 
costs from margins from cost from marketingborder = border + costs at + +border to border to farm to margin from 
price price border 
market market market farm to market 
The transport and marketing margins from the port to the market are 
added on because this cost incurred in bringing the import to the market 
and so it adds to the cost of the product. In the actual computation of the 
border price, the processing and marketing margins from the farmgate to 
the market were assumed to be negligible. Therefore the adjusted border 
price at the market is taken to be equivalent to its price at the farmgate. 
If the crop is exported, then the relevant border price is the f.o.b. 
price of the crop. To make the border price of an export comparable to the 
farm-gate price, the following adjustment is made. 
transport processing andAd.justed observed handling 
costs from marketingborder = border costs at •farm to margins fromprice price border border farm to border 
Another important adjustment that needs to be taken into 
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consideration is that the exchange rate used to convert the foreign price 
into the domestic currency might be under or over valued. Overvaluation 
taxes exports and subsidizes imports. The opposite is true for under 
valuation of the currency. In order to get a border price that would be 
present in the absence of government intervention in the exchange rate 
market, the equilibrium exchange rate needs to be used for the estimation 
of the border price. The resultant NPC's are referred to as Net NPC's as 
opposed to the unadjusted Gross NPC's. Gross NPC's overstate the extent 
of protection given to tradeables in the presence of overvaluation and 
understate the protection if the exchange rate is undervalued. However, for 
the purposes of this study only the Gross NPC's are estimated. 
•
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APPENDIX A8
 
ESTIMATION OF NET ECONOMIC BENEFIT (NEB).
 
To calculate the Net Economic Benefit per unit of cropped area of a 
crop(s), detailed information about its input structure is required. All data 
on input use were taken from various issues of Cost of Cultivation of 
Principal Crops in India, published by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Government of India, New Delhi. 
Sum of traded Sum of domestic resources andNet Economic Border price of 
= inputs at border nontraded inputs valued atBenefit output prices domestic shadow prices 
Methodology 
1) Border price and valuation of output and tradeables - The 
opportunity cost of crop output is measured by its border price adjusted for 
internal transportation and marketing costs. This would give the 
opportunity cost of producing a hectare of wheat at the point of 
competition of the import with domestic production. The opportunity cost 
of tradeable inputs (fertilizer and seed) in the crop's production structure is 
similarly estimated but at the national level. The input use of fertilizer and 
seed per hectare was taken from cost of cultivation data. The value of this 
in border price terms is calculated. This value subtracted from the output 
valued at border prices gives value added at border prices. This procedure is 
similar to that used for estimating value added at border prices for the EPC 
calculation. 
2) Valuation of land, labor and capital - In estimating the 
opportunity cost of primary inputs (land, labor, capital), the basic 
framework used is as follows. Say there is a hectare of land on which 
farmers can produce two competing crops X and Y. The opportunity cost of 
any input Z used in the production of X is its contribution to the foregone 
output Y. Z will be a fraction of Y as there are other contributing inputs. 
Thus, for every input, its next best alternative use is chosen and the value 
of a unit of the inputs contribution to the competing alternative, it 
marginal product, will be the opportunity cost. If the input markets are 
competitive and in equilibrium, the marginal product of an input across all 
competing activities is equalized. That is, the marginal product of Z in the 
production of X and Y will be the same. Thus, the marginal product of Z in 
•X is also its opportunity cost. This assumption, which is followed in this 
analysis, simplifies the calculation of opportunity cost considerably as will 
be seen below. 
In the estimation of the shadow price of primary and non-traded 
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intermediate inputs it has been assumed that competitive markets operate. 
a) Land - Though the opportunity cost of land could have been taken 
at its rental value under the assumption of competitive markets, the data 
source indicated that rental value was taken to be the prevailing village 
rates or the rates reported by the farmer. Further, the government has laws 
regarding fair rents. In consideration of this, the opportunity cost of land 
was excluded from the estimation. Thus, the estimated NEB will reflect 
economic profit due to the exclusion of the shadow price of land. 
b) Labor - The opportunity cost of labor is estimated by the wage rate. 
The wage rate, under the assumption of competitive labor markets, 
indicates what the market determines is the contribution of a unit of labor 
to output. This is the marginal product of labor and therefore its 
opportunity cost also. 
c) Capital- In the case of capital, its opportunity cost is given by 
assessing the marginal productivity of capital in its alternative uses. For 
instance, the opportunity cost of tractor services is estimated by the rental 
fee for tractors, under the assumption that competitive market for tractor 
services exists. Similar assumptions were made for assessing the marginal 
product of other capital goods. 
d) Valuation of Services, Utilities, Credit and Irrigation - The 
shadow price of irrigation was calculated by estimating the cost of 
production of a unit of water from a deep tube well (see Appendix AS). 
From this the cost of irrigating a hectare of wheat, mustard and chickpea 
was calculated for the various states. This estimation of the price of water 
involved valuing electricity and credit (capital) at their opportunity cost. 
Thus, it has indirectly included the opportunity cost of electricity and 
credit. The opportunity cost of electricity was the cost of supplying it 
without subsidy and that of capital is taken as the interest rate of short term 
government bonds. 
e) Depreciation - Depreciation reported in the cost of cultivation 
data is calculated on farm implements and buildings. 
Estimation 
Cost of cultivation data published by the Indian government gives 
the per hectare statewise breakdown of the units and costs of individual 
inputs that go into the production of each crop. 
Cost C1 = Value of total human, animal and machine labor 
+ Value of seed, fertilizer (traded inputs) 
+ Value of insecticides and pesticides 
+ Value of manure (owned and purchased) • 
+ Depreciation on farm implements and buildings 
+ Irrigation charges (with subsidies) 
+ Land revenue, cesses and other taxes. 
+ Interest on working capital (estimated at market int. rates) 
81 
+ Interest on owned fixed capital assets (excluding land) 
From cost e1, (i) the values of seed, fertilizer and irrigation are subtracted 
as they are traded inputs (their value at border prices is subtracted from the 
border price value of the crop to get value added in border prices). (ii) The 
economic cost of irrigation per hectare of crop is added to this. (iii) With all 
other costs per hectare valued at their shadow prices (opportunity cost), the 
resultant is the sum of domestic resources and non-traded inputs (valued 
at shadow prices). Due to incomplete data, the value of domestic resources 
were averaged for the periods 1980/81 to 1986/87 and 1987/88 to 1992/93. 
-
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